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This paper introduces a simulation procedure in the context of a demand system for vice -- 
marijuana, tobacco and alcohol -- to formally account for the inherent uncertainty in marijuana-
related data and parameters.  This entails using existing econometric estimates pertaining to the 
consumption of alcohol and tobacco, and the much more limited information on marijuana.  As an 
illustrative application of the framework, we simulate the impact on the consumption of vice of a 
reduction in the price of marijuana; changes in pre-existing taxes on tobacco and alcohol; 
legalisation of marijuana, which is then subject to taxation; and a tax tradeoff involving the 
introduction of a revenue-neutral tax on marijuana that is offset by reduced alcohol taxation.  The 
revenue-maximising tax rate of about 50 percent is estimated to yield additional revenue of about 
15 percent of the pre-existing proceeds from vice taxation.  The role of uncertainty surrounding 
preference interactions within vice, as well as the uncertainties regarding marijuana data, is 
highlighted by providing the whole distribution of each endogenous variable.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper deals with the determinants of consumption of a good that, officially at least, 
does not exist -- marijuana.  Despite the denial of its existence by officialdom, estimates indicate 
that the consumption of marijuana is quite substantial in many countries.  In Australia, for instance, 
more than one in three people say they have tried marijuana, and Clements and Daryal (2005) 
estimate that its sales are something like twice those of wine.  More generally, illicit drug use is part 
of the underground economy and a number of studies using a variety of approaches have 
investigated the order of magnitude of this sector.  A recent paper by Bajada (1999) that uses the 
currency demand approach concludes that the value of the Australian underground economy is 
about 15 percent of measured GDP.  The widespread use of marijuana, its unique tax-free status, 
the current interest in its decriminalisation/legalisation and the size of the underground economy all 
make research on the economics of marijuana consumption a worthwhile endeavor. 
Empirical studies show that marijuana is closely related in consumption to at least two other 
goods.
1  As in many instances marijuana is mixed with tobacco and then smoked, there is a 
presumption that these goods are complements.  Furthermore, as marijuana and alcoholic beverages 
contain intoxicating properties that are similar in the minds of many consumers, they both tend to 
serve the same want, and it is reasonable to suppose that they are substitutes.  Accordingly, 
marijuana consumption could be expected to be negatively related to the price of tobacco, and 
positively related to alcohol prices.  Symmetry of the substitution effects means that the 
consumption of alcohol and tobacco will respond in a similar manner to variations in marijuana 
prices.  These considerations imply that the consumption of the three goods, which we dub the 
demand for vice, needs to be modeled jointly, as an interrelated system of demand equations.   
These links of marijuana consumption to tobacco and alcohol would also imply cross-commodity 
impacts of any policy changes, so that changes in one drug market are likely to have impacts on 
related markets.  For example, what would be the likely impacts on the markets for tobacco and 
alcohol, as well as the revenue from taxing these products, if there were further decriminalisation of 
marijuana?  What is the potential tax revenue from marijuana were it legalised? And how would 
changes in taxation and regulation arrangements for beer, wine, spirits and tobacco impact on 
marijuana consumption?   
                                                 
1 See, for example, Cameron and Williams (2001), Clements and Daryal (2005), Saffer and Chaloupka (1995), and 
Zhao and Harris (2004).   2
Answers to these questions depend crucially on unofficial estimates of the price and 
quantity data for marijuana, as well as a consistent set of own- and cross-price elasticities 
characterising the interrelationships in consumption of vice.  The problem in constructing such a 
demand system is that hard data on marijuana consumption are just not available; even the data on 
alcohol and tobacco consumption are not perfect as, due to the typically high excise taxes that these 
goods bear, there are substantial incentives to underreport, or not report at all, to avoid the tax net.
2  
This is an extreme example of the situation faced in modeling exercises such as equilibrium 
displacement modeling (EDM) (see, e.g., Zhao et al., 2000) and computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) modeling (see, e.g., Dixon and Rimmer, 2002).  If there are  n  consumer goods, a CGE 
model then requires numerical values of  n  income elasticties and  n
2  own- and cross-price 
elasticities, which for  n = 100, not an atypical value for a contemporary CGE model, implies that 
more than 10,000 individual elasticities are required.  As it is impossible to obtain econometric 
estimates of such a large number of parameters, CGE models almost invariably employ separability 
theory to reduce the number of unknowns to manageable proportions.
3 
Even if CGE modelers do not have the required number of high-quality econometric 
estimates to draw upon for the basis of their elasticities, they typically do have substantial quantities 
of data on consumption patterns and prices.  As mentioned above, such is not the case for 
marijuana, and we have to rely on unofficial data that are surely subject to more than the usual 
questions about their quality.  In this paper, we introduce a simulation procedure in the context of a 
demand system for vice -- marijuana, tobacco and alcohol -- to formally account for the inherent 
uncertainty in the marijuana-related data and elasticities.  We use separability theory as a basis for 
organising the fragmentary information that is available on marijuana consumption, and then 
combine that with econometric estimates and data pertaining to tobacco and alcohol.  We then use 
stochastic simulations as a way to formally recognise the substantial uncertainties inherent in all 
aspects of the consumption of marijuana, as well as those associated with tobacco and alcohol.  
Zhao et al. (2000) have used a similar approach in the context of sensitivity analysis for an EDM of 
the Australian wool industry.  We extend that approach by simulating the implied distributions of 
                                                 
2 The situation in Russia provides an illuminating example. The Economist (September 13, 2003, p. 66) describes it as 
follows: “The figures prove what everyone knows: Russians drink like mad. In 2001, alcohol overdoses killed 139 
people in England and Wales, but more than 40,000 Russians, in a population less than three times the size. But other 
official figures indicate quite the opposite: the average Briton consumed the equivalent of 8.4 litres of pure alcohol in 
2001, the average Russian swallowed a mere 8.1 litres. Why the discrepancy? A mix of understated production by 
Russian distillers and the Russian taste for industrial alcohol or toxic moonshine could be one explanation.” 
3 An example of a prominent CGE model that employs this approach is MONASH (Dixon and Rimmer, 2002, Sec. 
17.4).   3
demand elasticities through the quantification of the uncertainty in fundamental preference 
parameters within a complete demand specification, and by also allowing for uncertainty in 
marijuana-related data.  These procedures may be of general interest, and have applications in 
equilibrium displacement and CGE modeling, and other areas of applied economics.  As an 
illustrative application of the framework, we simulate the cross-commodity impacts of price and tax 
changes. 
This paper is structured as follows.  The next section sets out the analytical framework of 
the differential approach to consumption economics; this approach highlights the links between 
preferences and observable consumption behaviour within a general setting.  Section 3 deals with 
the application of this approach to the demand for vice.  Section 4 introduces the uncertainty 
involved in cross-commodity demand relationships for vice by specifying subjective probability 
distributions for the basic preference parameters, allowing for varying degrees of preference 
structure and deriving the implied probability distributions through Monte Carlo simulation for the 
price elasticities.  To illustrate the approach, in Section 5 we simulate the impact on the 
consumption of vice of a reduction in the price of marijuana (possibly resulting from productivity 
enhancement in its cultivation and/or lighter regulation), and changes in the taxes on tobacco and 
alcohol.  We also derive the revenue-maximising marijuana tax, and provide results on the tradeoff 
between marijuana and alcohol taxes, whereby the tax proceeds from marijuana are redistributed to 
drinkers in the form of lower alcohol taxes.  Throughout the analysis the role of uncertainty 
surrounding preference interactions within vice, as well as the uncertainties regarding data 
pertaining to the consumption of marijuana, is highlighted by providing the whole distribution of 
each endogenous variable.  Section 6 contains concluding comments. 
 
2. DEMAND  EQUATIONS 
 
This section sets out the analytical framework that is applied subsequently to the demand for 
vice.  We use Theil’s (1980) differential approach to consumption theory due to its generality and 
elegant simplicity, and because it makes transparent the link between the structure of preferences 
and the nature of the demand equations. 
Let   i p   be the price of good  i  (i = 1, …, n) and  qi  the corresponding quantity demanded.  
Then  
n
ii i1 Mp q = =∑   is total expenditure on the n goods (“income” for short) and   ii i wp q / M =   
is the share of income devoted to good  i  , also known as the budget share of  i  .  Furthermore, let    4
n
ii i1 d(logQ) w d(logq) = = ∑   be the Divisia volume index of the change in the consumer’s real 
income.  It follows from the budget constraint that  
n
ii i1 d(logQ) d(logM) w d(logp) = =− ∑   , so 
that the change in real income is the change in money income deflated by a price index, which is a 
budget-share weighted average of the  n  price changes.  Under general conditions, we can express 
the demand equation for good  i  in differential form as 
(2.1)        
n
ii i i j j
j1
w d(logq) d(logQ) d(logp ) d(log P)
=
′   =θ + ν −   ∑ , 
where   ii i (p q )/ M θ= ∂ ∂   is the marginal share of good  i ;   ij ν  is the  (i, j)
th  Frisch price 
coefficient; and  
n
ii i1 d(logP) d(logp) = ′ =θ ∑   is the Frisch price index, which uses as weights 
marginal shares.  If we divide both sides of equation (2.1) by  wi  , we find that   iii /w η= θ   is the 
income elasticity of demand for good i, while  
*
ij ij i /w η= ν   is the  (i, j)
th  Frisch price elasticity, 
which holds constant the marginal utility of income.  The marginal share   i θ   in equation (2.1) 
answers the question, if income rises by one dollar what proportion of this increase is spent on good  
i ?  It follows from the budget constraint that  
n
i i1 1 = θ = ∑  . 
Let the utility function be   1n u(q ,...,q ) u( ) = q   , where   i [q ] = q   is the consumption vector, 
and  
2u/ ′ =∂ ∂ ∂ Uq q   be the Hessian matrix.  A sufficient condition for a budget-constrained utility 
maximum is for  U   to be negative definite.  The Frisch coefficient   ij ν   in equation (2.1) is defined 
as  
ij
ij (p p / M ) u λ  , where   0 λ>   is the marginal utility of income and u
ij is the  (i, j)
th  element of 
the inverse of the Hessian  
1 − U  .  If we write   ij [] = ν ν   for the matrix of Frisch coefficients and P 
for the diagonal matrix with  p1, …, pn  on the main diagonal, we then have 
(2.2)               
1 (/ M )
− =λ PU P ν . 
As   ,M 0 λ> ,  P  is a symmetric positive definite matrix and  U
-1  is symmetric negative definite, 
we can conclude that  ν  is also symmetric negative definite.  Inverting both sides of equation (2.2), 
we obtain 
(2.3)              
-1 -1 (M/ ) =λ PU P
−1 ν ,   5
or  
ij 2
ii jj (M/ ) u/ (p q ) (p q ) ν= λ∂ ∂ ∂  , where  
ij ν   is the  (i, j)
th  element of  
1 − ν   .  As  ii u/ (p q) ∂∂  is 
the marginal utility of a dollar spent on  i ,  
2
ii jj u/ (p q) (p q) ∂∂ ∂   is interpreted as the change in this 
marginal utility when spending on  j  increases by one dollar.  Accordingly, equation (2.3) shows 
that the Frisch coefficient matrix  ν  is inversely proportional to the Hessian matrix of the utility 
function in expenditure terms.  The final property of  ν  is that its row sums are proportional to the 
corresponding marginal shares, 






ν= φ θ = ∑ . 
The proportionality factor   0 φ<   is the reciprocal of the income elasticity of the marginal utility of 
income, known as the “income flexibility” for short. 
The substitution term of equation (2.1) contains the  
th j   price twice, once explicitly and 
once within the Frisch price index.  We use equation (2.4) to combine these by writing the 
substitution term as   () () ( ) ji j j kk k ji j j dl o g p dl o g p dl o g p , ∑∑ ∑  ν− θ= π   where   ij ij i j π= ν− φ θθ  
is the  ()
th i, j   Slutsky price coefficient.  This coefficient, and the corresponding elasticity   
ij ij i w η= π , deal with the impact on the consumption of good  i  of a change in the price of  j  on 
account of the total substitution effect, real income remaining unchanged.  If alternatively we hold 
money income constant, the Marshallian (or uncompensated) price elasticity,   ij ij i j w ′ η= η− η  , gives 
the percentage change in the consumption of  i  following a one-percent change in the price of  j . 
Next, we consider the implications for the demand equations of the case whereby tastes are 
such that utility is additive in the n goods,  
n
1n i i i1 u(q ,...,q ) u (q ) = =∑  , where   ii u (q )  is a sub-utility 
function that depends only on the consumption of good  i .  In this case,   ii i u/ q du /dq ∂∂=  , all 
second-order cross derivatives vanish and the Hessian  U  , and its inverse  
1 − U  , are both diagonal 
matrices.  Due to the absence of utility interactions among goods, this specification of tastes is 
known as a preference independence (PI).  PI means that all the price coefficients   ij ν   for  ij ≠   are 
zero and from equation (2.4),   ii i , i 1,...,n ν= φ θ =  .  Accordingly, under PI demand equation (2.1) 
simplifies to 
              ii i i i w d(logq ) d(logQ) d(logp ) d(logP ) ′ =θ +φθ −       ,   6
so that all cross-price Frisch elasticities,  
*
ij η   for  ij ≠  , are zero.  Further implications of PI are that  
(i)  Frisch own-price elasticities are proportional to the corresponding income elasticities; and  (ii)  
inferior goods are ruled out.  These implications of PI are restrictive and clearly the hypothesis will 




3. APPLICATION  TO  VICE 
 
This section proceeds to derive income and price elasticities of demand for marijuana, 
tobacco and alcohol, which we dub “vice”, as well as for a residual category all other goods, which 
we call “other”, so that  n = 4 goods. 
Budget Shares, Income Elasticities, Marginal Shares and the Income Flexibility 
Column 2 of Table 1 gives the budget shares of the four goods.  On the basis of data 
presented in Appendix 1, these values are not too far away from the observed shares in Australia in 
the 1990s.  As discussed in Appendix 1, the underlying marijuana quantity data are estimated from 
a frequency of consumption survey together with assumptions regarding intensity of use.  The 
marijuana price data are based on information supplied by the Australian Bureau of Criminal 
Intelligence.  These data are subject to more than the usual degree of uncertainty, a feature that will 
be taken into account in the analysis below.  Column 3 of Table 1 specifies that the income 
elasticity of marijuana is 1.2, making it a modest luxury; that of tobacco is 0.4, a necessity; and 
alcohol is 1.0, a borderline case.  The marginal shares of the first three commodities are computed 
as   ii i w θ= × η , and these values are given as the first three elements of column 4 of Table 1.  The 
marginal share for other is defined residually as  
3
4i i1 1 = θ =− θ ∑  .  The value of the income 
flexibility  φ  is specified as -0.5. 
The basis for the above values of the income elasticities is as follows.  As there are few, if 
any, reliable published estimates of   i η   for marijuana, there is clearly not much to go on other than 
the similarities between this good and alcohol.  Accordingly, there is some presumption that 
consumers regard the luxuriousness of these two goods to be similar.  As discussed below, we use  
i 1 η=   for alcohol, but we have a mild preference to regard marijuana as having a slightly higher  
                                                 
4 For more details of the material of this section, see Clements (1987).   7
i η  .  While marijuana is reported to be consumed by a variety of types of people, it is reasonable to 
suppose that young adults, university students and baby boomers are well represented.
5  As these 
socioeconomic groups tend to be affluent, we set the income elasticity of marijuana at slightly 
above unity at 1.2.  It must be emphasised, however, that due to the absence of hard evidence, we 
cannot have too much confidence in the precision of this estimate, although there is no compelling 
reason to expect it to be a biased one way or the other.  In contrast to marijuana, there have been a 
large number of studies published on tobacco demand; for reviews of the literature, see Cameron 
(1998) and Chaloupka and Warner (2000).  A recent meta-analysis of 86 different studies of 
tobacco consumption by Gallet and List (2003) reports a mean income elasticity of 0.42.
6  
However, there is still considerable dispersion among the underlying elasticities as the standard 
deviation is quite large at 0.43.  We thus set   i 0.4 η =   for tobacco, and keep in mind the 
uncertainties. 
The good “alcohol” comprises beer, wine and spirits as a group.  To analyse the income 
elasticity of the group, write total expenditure on alcohol as  
3
Ai i i1 Mp q = =∑  , where   i p ,   i q  a r e  
the price and the quantity demanded of beverage  i  (i = 1, 2, 3, for beer, wine and spirits).  Let  
ii iA wp q / M ′ =  be the conditional budget share of beverage  i .  The change in total expenditure can 
then be decomposed into price and quantity indexes,   AA A d(logM ) d(logP ) d(logQ ) = +  , where  
3
Ai i i1 d(logP ) w d(logp ) = ′ =∑   and  
3
Ai i i1 d(logQ ) w d(logq ) = ′ =∑  .  Accordingly, the natural way to 
measure the consumption of alcohol as a whole is via the Divisia volume index   A d(logQ ).  The 
income elasticity of demand for alcohol is then  
A
Ai i i d(logQ )/d(logM) w′ =η ∑  , where   
A
ii (logq )/ (logM) η= ∂ ∂   is the income elasticity of beverage  i , M being income.  Prior studies 
almost invariably find 
A
i η  for beer to be less than one, and not infrequently of the order of 0.5, 
making this beverage a necessity.  As wine and spirits are more luxurious than beer, estimates of 
their  
A
i η   tend to be substantially above one.
7  As in the case of tobacco, there is considerable 
uncertainty surrounding the precise numerical values of the alcohol elasticities.  With these 
                                                 
5 For an analysis of university students’ marijuana consumption, see Daryal (2002). 
6 The median of the short-run income elasticities is 0.28, while that of the long-run elasticities is 0.39. 
7 For a brief review of prior studies, see Clements and Selvanathan (1991).  More recently, Selvanathan and 
Selvanathan (2005, p. 232, 237) use time-series data for 10 countries to estimate conditional income elasticities for the 
three alcoholic beverages. Averaging over countries, they obtain 0.75 for beer, 1.1 for wine and 1.42 for spirits, or using 
a somewhat different approach 0.75, 0.98 and 1.39 (in the same order).  In view of sampling variability, these values are 
unlikely to be significantly different to those described in the text.   8
considerations in mind, we shall use  
A
i 0.5 η=   for beer and 1.5 for both wine and spirits.  The data 
given in Appendix 3 for Australia reveal that over the 1990s beer absorbs about one half of total 
expenditure on alcohol, with the reminder split roughly evenly between wine and spirits, so that  
i w0 . 5 ′ ≈   for beer, and  0.25  for both wine and spirits.  Using these values yields the income 
elasticity for alcohol as a whole of  
3 A
ii i1 w1 = ′η = ∑  , which agrees well with direct estimates of this 
elasticity obtained for Australia by Clements and Johnson (1983) and Clements and Selvanathan 
(1991).
8  On this basis, we set the   i η   for alcohol as a whole equal to 1.  However, that even in the 
case of alcohol it is appropriate to acknowledge the considerable uncertainty regarding the value of 
its income elasticity. 
The final income elasticity to be considered is that of the marginal utility of income, which, 
in reciprocal form, is the income flexibility  φ .  Specifying that   0.5 φ=−   is based on the 
following prior findings.  Selvanathan (1993) uses time-series data to estimate a differential 
demand system for each of 15 OECD countries.  For Australia, the  φ-estimate is –0.46 , with 
asymptotic standard error (ASE) 0.08 (Selvanathan, 1993, p. 189).  When the data are pooled over 
the 15 countries, the estimate of  φ  is –0.45, with ASE 0.02 (Selvanathan, 1993, p. 198).  Using a 
related approach, Selvanathan (1993, Sec. 6.4) obtains 322 estimates of  φ , one for each year in the 
sample period for each of 18 OECD countries; the weighted mean of these estimates is very similar 
to those above at –0.46 (ASE = 0.03).  Two other cross-country estimates of  φ  are also relevant: 
Using the ICP data for 30 countries from Kravis et al. (1982), Theil (1987, Sec. 2.8) obtains a       
φ-estimate of –0.53 (0.04).  Chen (1999, p. 171) estimates a demand system for 42 countries and 
obtains an estimate of  φ  of –0.42 (0.05), when there are intercepts in his differential demand 
equations, which play the role of residual trends in consumption, and –0.29 (0.05) when there are 
no such intercepts.  The final element of support for using   0.5 φ =−   is the earlier, but still 
influential, survey by Brown and Deaton (1972, p. 1206) who review previous findings and 
conclude that “there would seem to be fair agreement on the use of a value for  φ  around minus 
one half”.  Taken as a whole, it thus seems not unreasonable to use a  φ-value of –0.5.
9 
                                                 
8 A unity income elasticity for alcohol also agrees with the evidence in Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005, p. 195) 
who estimate this elasticity for 40 countries with time-series data.  The average of these 40 estimates is 1.04.  Using a 
somewhat different approach, the mean of another 40 estimates is 0.96 (Selvanathan and Selvanathan, 2005, p. 207). 
9 It should be noted that treating the income flexibility as a constant parameter is at variance with Frisch’s (1959) 
famous conjecture that φ should increase in absolute value as the consumer becomes more affluent. However, most 
tests of the Frisch conjecture tend to reject it; see, e.g., Clements and Theil (1996), Selvanathan (1993, Secs. 4.8 and   9
Vice Interactions 
Prior empirical evidence clearly indicates that marijuana, tobacco and alcohol are closely 
related in consumption. Using unit record data from the Australian National Drug Strategy 
Household Surveys (NDSHS) involving over 40,000 individuals, Zhao and Harris (2004) report 
sample statistics given in Table 2 that demonstrate this relationship.  As can be seen from the 
unconditional proportions of column 2, 14 percent of respondents say that they consume marijuana, 
24 percent consume tobacco and 84 percent consume alcohol.  However, from the conditional 
proportions of column 3, as many as 56 percent of marijuana users also smoke tobacco;  as this is 
more than twice the corresponding unconditional percentage of 24 percent, this points to marijuana 
and tobacco being used by the same consumers simultaneously, or the two goods being 
complementary in consumption.
10  This would also seem to be supported by the symmetrical 
comparison: among users of tobacco, 34 percent also use marijuana, much larger than the 
proportion of the whole population who use marijuana, 14 percent.  The unconditional and 
conditional relative frequencies in the last row of Table 2 are closer together, so there seems to be 
less evidence of complementarity when alcohol is involved. 
A more formal way to measure the interactions between goods in consumption is via the 
cross-price effects.  However, econometric estimates of these effects for the three drugs tend to be 
inconclusive.  Demand studies using unit record survey data are often hindered by the unavailability 
of individual-level price data.  In addition, consumption data from drug surveys are almost always 
in the form of answers to discrete choices, which means that none of the microeconometric demand 
studies involving these drugs can use a demand system that incorporates symmetry of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6.5), Theil (1975/76, Sec. 15.4), Theil (1987, Sec. 2.13) and Theil and Brooks (1970/71). On the other hand, evidence 
supporting Frisch has been reported by DeJanvry et al. (1972) and Lluch et al. (1977).  Note also that according to 
Frisch (1959, p. 189) a φ -value of –0.5 would pertain to the “middle income bracket, ‘the median part’ of the 
population”, which is perhaps not unreasonable. 
10 The idea of using information on consumption patterns in this manner to identify substitutes and complements can be 
clarified as follows.  Suppose we hold constant prices and total expenditure on vice, and some shock hits the market 
that results in a reshuffling of the consumption basket, causing some elements to increase and others to decrease.  The 
source of such a shock could be the release of new findings on the health effects of vice consumption, a police 
crackdown on illicit drugs, legalisation, etc. If this shock leads to a rise in the consumption of good  i  that is 
accompanied by a simultaneous fall in that of good  j, what can be said about the relationship between these two goods?  
As additional consumption of one is offset by reduced consumption of the other they are competitive, so that both 
goods satisfy the same basic want of the consumer and it would be reasonable to describe the two goods as being 
substitutes.  Conversely, goods that are positively correlated are complements in consumption.  As in order to keep total 
expenditure unchanged, additional spending on one good has to be offset by reduced spending on others, it follows that 
on average at least all goods are substitutes.  This notion of substitutability goes back to Allen and Bowley (1935) and 
is based the co-movement of quantities, while the more conventional approach employs the sign of the effect on 
consumption of good  i  of a change in the  j
th  price.  As income is not held constant in Table 2, the above argument has 
to be qualified as the co-movement between marijuana and tobacco could also possibly reflect a common income effect.   10
substitution effects.  Such a study could find that the coefficient on the price of drug B in the 
demand equation for drug A was negative, implying that the two are complements; but the same 
study could also find from the equation for drug B that the same two drugs are substitutes.  When 
this approach is adopted, there is no internal consistency of choice and the interpretation of the 
estimated price responses can be problematic.  Overall, though, the available micro-level studies in 
Australia seem to point to a complementary relationship between marijuana and tobacco, and 
substitutability between marijuana and alcohol.  Using the NDSHS data between 1988 and 1995, 
Cameron and Williams (2001) find that tobacco is a complement for marijuana, and marijuana is a 
substitute for alcohol.  Using a trivariate approach and the NDSHS data between 1995 and 2001, 
Zhao and Harris (2004) find a similar pattern, although the substitutability relationship between 
marijuana and alcohol is insignificant.
11 
Another study by Harris et al. (forthcoming) investigates alcohol consumption for different 
types of drinkers using a flexible model.  While there is some indication of a complementary 
relationship between alcohol participation and marijuana, the response of frequent drinkers to the 
marijuana price is insignificant.  Williams and Mahmoudi (2004) also find marijuana and alcohol to 
be complements for people who admit to using both drugs at the same time.  In a review of the US 
literature on the interactions within vice, Cameron and Williams (2001) point out that US studies do 
not typically use marijuana prices due to their unavailability, and instead use proxies such as 
whether or not a state has decriminalised the use of marijuana.  Cameron and Williams note that on 
the basis of two prior US studies (Chaloupka et al., 1999, and Farrelly et al., 1999), the evidence 
can probably be interpreted as saying that marijuana and tobacco are complements.  Another 
finding to emerge from their survey is that the US evidence regarding the relationship between 
marijuana and alcohol is mixed, with some studies finding them to be substitutes and others 
complements. 
One other Australian study is worth mentioning.  Clements and Daryal (2005) use aggregate 
time-series data on marijuana consumption derived from the micro information from the NDSHS 
on individuals’ consumption frequencies, together with published data on the consumption of three 
alcohol beverages, beer, wine and spirits.  Making a rough adjustment to hold income constant, they 
                                                 
11 But to complicate matters somewhat, in the context of alcohol consumption, Williams and Mahmoudi (2004) and 
Harris et al. (forthcoming) find some evidence of marijuana and alcohol being complements.   11
analyse the correlations between the consumption of the four goods, and find some evidence 
indicating that marijuana is a substitute for each of the three alcoholic beverages.
12 
Four other studies deal with the interrelationship in consumption of tobacco and alcohol.  
First, Goel and Morey (1995) analyse the demand for tobacco and spirits with panel data for the 
states of the US.  They find that as the cross-price elasticities are positive, these two goods are 
substitutes in consumption.  But as these authors exclude from their study the other two alcoholic 
beverages, beer and wine, this can only be treated as weak evidence regarding the relationship 
between tobacco and alcohol.  Second, in a study of vice computation in the UK, Jones (1989) uses 
aggregate time-series data to estimate a demand system for tobacco, beer, wine, spirits, cider, and 
all other goods.  The cross-price elasticities between tobacco consumption and the four alcoholic 
beverages are all negative, indicating complementarity.  However, only one of the four elasticities 
is highly significant (tobacco-spirits) and Jones (1989, p. 99) concludes “although the estimated 
cross-price elasticities should not be treated with too much confidence, they do provide evidence of 
complementarity between the two activities”.  Third, Duffy (1991) analyses the joint determinants 
of the demand for beer, wine, spirits and tobacco in the UK.  Conditional on the consumption of 
this group of products remaining unchanged, he finds both substitutability and complementarity 
between alcoholic beverages on the one hand, and tobacco on the other, but none of these effects is 
significantly different form zero (Duffy, 1991, p. 376).  But for the unconditional demand 
equations, when group consumption is allowed to vary, and the restrictions of homogeneity and 
symmetry are imposed, he finds substitutability in each of the three pairwise cases (Duffy, p. 378).  
However, while the t-values increase in going from the conditional to unconditional demand 
equations, the effects are still not highly significant.  In the fourth study, Decker and Schwartz 
(2000) use individual data from the US and find that higher alcohol prices discourage smoking, 
while higher cigarette prices increase drinking.  Thus, the two goods cannot be classified as either 
substitutes or complements in an unambiguous manner, a problem that highlights the difficulties in 
studying consumption of related goods within a single-equation framework. 
While not completely clear cut, prior findings regarding vice interactions can probably be 
summarised as follows.  Marijuana and tobacco are in all probability complements, while there is 
no consensus regarding the interactions within vice involving alcohol.  In what follows, we analyse 
the interactions between the consumption of the three drugs via the specification of the Frisch price 
                                                 
12 Clements and Daryal (2005) also estimate the Rotterdam demand model for marijuana, beer, wine and spirits, with 
preference independence imposed (to keep things manageable).  As this rules out complementarity, their estimates are 
not able to shed any light on the issue of substitutes versus complements.    12
coefficients   ij ν  , which are fundamental behavioural parameters directly related to the consumer’s 
utility function.  To organise the discussion, we start with the restrictive structure of preference 
independence and then move to a more flexible structure that allows for specific 
substitutability/complementarity.   These preference structures are translated into sets of price 
elasticities that are consistent with prior evidence summarised above.  
First-Pass on the Price Elasticities: Preference Independence 
As a starting point, we shall assume that the four goods are preference independent in the 
consumer’s utility function.  Using the data of Table 1, Table 3 presents the results and several 
comments can be made.  First, for each element of vice the three versions of the own-price 
elasticities are quite similar, as can be seen by the following: 
  Frisch 
*
ii η  Slutsky ii η  Marshallian ii ′ η  
Marijuana -.60  -.59  -.61 
Tobacco -.20  -.20  -.21 
Alcohol -.50  -.48  -.52  . 
Second, due to the substantial income effect, the three values of the own-price elasticity for other  
*
44 44 44 ( 0.50, 0.04 and 0.96) η= − η= − η= − ′   differ considerably.  Third, the cross-price elasticities 
involving vice are all quite small, which is due to (i) the assumption of preference independence 
and (ii) the small budget shares of these goods.  Finally, the three versions of the cross-price 
elasticities pertaining to the effects of the price of other on the consumption of vice are quite 
different: 
  Frisch 
*
i4 η  Slutsky i4 η  Marshallian i4 ′ η  
Marijuana 0  .56  -.55 
Tobacco 0  .19  -.18 
Alcohol 0 .46  -.46  . 
The above Frisch elasticities are zero by the assumption of PI.  The Slutsky counterparts reflect the 
operation of the general substitution effect; the positive signs indicate substitutability, which is 
implied by preference independence.  The three Marshallian elasticities are all negative, indicating 
complementarity due to the size of the income effect.   13
Second-Pass Price Elasticities 
Under preference independence, the  4 × 4  matrix of price coefficients  ν  h a s  t h e  
following structure: 
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We now generalise this structure by allowing marijuana and tobacco to be specific complements, so 
that   12 ν   becomes negative.  We thus now specify   12 0 ν =α<  , but additionally in view of the 
symmetry of  ν  and the row-sum constraints (2.4), the values of many of the other previously 
nonzero elements of the matrix must change.  In what follows, we discuss in turn each of the four 
rows of  ν . 
The Marijuana Row: The elements of the first row of  ν ,  11 12 13 14 ,,, ν ννν  , refer to the 
responsiveness of marijuana consumption to changes in the four relative prices.  Under (i) PI and 
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For PD, we have enforced the row-sum constraint by setting   13 ν =−α  and leaving  11 14 and ν ν   
unchanged.  This means that marijuana and alcohol are specified to be specific substitutes, while 
marijuana and other continue to be independent.  The decision to leave the value of   11 ν   unchanged 
at   1 φθ  , while not the only possibility, is justified on the basis of simplicity and in view of 
subsequent developments, this turns out to be a convenient approach.  As the  (i, j)
th  F r i s c h  
elasticity is  
*
ij ij i /w η= ν  , the specification that   12 13 ν =−ν   implies that  
**
12 13 η =− η  , so that if the 
relative prices of tobacco and alcohol both rise by the same proportionate amount, there are exactly 
offsetting effects as the consumption of marijuana remains unchanged.  The justification for 
marijuana and other to remain independent is that as we have no strong priors about their 
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As   ij ji ν= ν , under PD   21 ν= α  since   12 ν =α .  In other words, if marijuana and tobacco are 
specific substitutes, so also are tobacco and marijuana.  We use the same approach as above in 
dealing with the row-sum constraint by setting   13 ν =− α , so that tobacco and alcohol are specific 
substitutes.  As again we have no strong priors, we take tobacco and other to be independent. 
The Alcohol Row: The third row of  ν  is 
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Under PD, the elements   31 ν   and   32 ν   are both equal to  −α  due to symmetry.  As before, we take 
alcohol and other to be independent, so that   34 0 ν =  .  The constraint on the sum of the elements in 
the alcohol row under PD then implies that   33 3 2 ν =φθ + α . 











By symmetry, the first three elements of this row are determined by the last elements in each of the 
first three rows.  Accordingly, these elements are all zeros under PI and PD, so that this row takes 
exactly the same form under the two specifications. 
Combining together the above four rows, the new  ν  matrix is 
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What value should the negative parameter  α  take?  A rise in the relative price of tobacco reduces 
consumption of that good and, as marijuana and tobacco are specified as complements, marijuana 
consumption also falls.  Similarly, a rise in marijuana prices causes the consumption of both 
marijuana and tobacco to fall.  As the parameter α represents the degree of complementarity 
between marijuana and tobacco, it would seem not unreasonable for  α  to be the higher (in 
absolute value), the higher is the own-price responsiveness of both marijuana and tobacco, as 
measured by   12 and φθ φθ  .  One way to implement this idea is to specify α as some proportion of 
the mean of   12 and φθ φθ  .  If we use the geometric mean, so that 
(3.2)                 12 ,1 0 α=ρ φ θ θ − <ρ< , 
then we can interpret the proportionality factor  ρ  as a type of correlation coefficient. 
According to equation (2.3),  
−1 ν   is proportional to the inverse of the Hessian matrix of the 
utility function in expenditure terms.  Thus, to analyse the implications of matrix (3.1) for the 
structure of the utility function, we need its inverse.  While this inverse is available, its form is 
complex.  Some insights are available, however, if we follow Barten (1964) and use an 
approximation to the inverse.  We can express   ij =[ ] ν ν   as  = - ( + ) DI D ν Γ ,    where   
1/2
ii =diag[- ] ν D  , and   ij =[ ] γ Γ   is a symmetric  4 4 ×   matrix with diagonal elements zero.  This 
means that the (i, j)
th off-diagonal element of  ν  takes the form   ij ij ii jj ν =γ ν ν  .  Thus as       
12 ν= α  , in view of equation (3.2), we find that   12 γ= ρ .  If the elements of  Γ  are not “too large”, 
then 
(3.3)                
-1 -1 -1 -( ) ≈− DI D νΓ . 
Thus  
ii
ii 1 ν≈ ν  and  
12
12 0 ν≈ − ρ φ θ θ> .  As  
12 2
11 22 u( p q ) ( p q ) ν∝ ∂ ∂ ∂  , we see that 
additional spending on tobacco raises the marginal utility of expenditure on marijuana.  Note also 
that  
12 11 22
11 22 ν≈ − ρνν≈ − ρ νν .  Accordingly, 
12 11 22 −ρ≈ν ν ν   is now interpreted as a 
type of correlation coefficient for the relevant elements of  
−1 ν  , so its value determines the degree   16
of complementarity between marijuana and tobacco where complementarity is understood to refer 
here to the interaction in the utility function. 
The value of the parameter  ρ  determines the degree of complementarity between 
marijuana and tobacco.  As it is difficult to have strong prior ideas of the precise degree of this 
complementarity, and since   1 0 − <ρ<  , we shall focus on the case in which   0.5 ρ=−  , a value 
mid-way between the two extremes.  Using the same basic data given in Table 1, Table 4 contains 
the results for  0.5 ρ=−  .  In Panel B, the second element of the first row,  
12 ν  , equals  94.5.  The 
corresponding diagonal elements of  
−1 ν   are   111.2
11 ν= −   and   361.6
12 ν= −  , which, if we 
ignore the signs, have a geometric mean of about 200.  Accordingly, the ratio of  
12 ν   to this 
geometric mean is about 0.5 , which is the absolute value of  ρ .   This result is reassuring about the 
adequacy of approximation (3.3).  The value of  
13 ν   is –2.2, which is much smaller in absolute 
value than  
12 ν  , implying that the marginal utility of marijuana expenditure is less sensitive to 
variations in alcohol spending than it is to tobacco spending.  From Panels C, E and F, the three 
versions of the own-price elasticities for vice are 
  Frisch 
*
ii η  Slutsky ii η  Marshallian ii ′ η  
Marijuana -.60  -.59  -.61 
Tobacco -.20  -.20  -.21 
Alcohol -.67  -.65  -.69  . 
For a given product, the three elasticities are quite similar, as before with preference independence.  
Comparing these to the corresponding values of Table 3, which are based on preference 
independence ( 0 ρ= ), we see that the results are identical for marijuana and tobacco; for alcohol, 
however, when   0.5 ρ=−   the own-price elasticities are now somewhat larger (in absolute value). 
Next, in Figure 1 we explore the implication of differing values of ρ for the key elasticities.  
Consider first the three versions of the elasticity of demand for marijuana with respect to the price 
of tobacco -- Frisch, Slutsky and Marshallian.  Frisch takes the form  
*
12 12 1 1 2 1 ww η= ν = ρ φ θ θ . 
If we invert the scales on both the vertical and horizontal axes, the plot of this elasticity against  ρ 
is a ray coming out of  the origin, as can be seen from Panel A of Figure 1.  The corresponding 
Slutsky elasticity is 
*
12 12 1 2 1 w η= η− φ θ θ  , the plot of which is parallel to Frisch, with vertical 
intercept equal to the general substitution effect   12 1 /w 0.5 0.024 0.008/0.02 0.0048 −φθθ = × × =  , 
which is very small.  Finally, the Marshallian elasticity is   12 12 1 2 w ′ η =η −η  , which differs from   17
Slutsky by the income effect of the price change,   12 w 1.2 0.02 0.024 −η= − × = −  , and is thus the 
“top” curve in Panel A.  The main message of Panel A is that the three cross elasticities all increase 
in absolute value with  ρ , but only about half as fast.  Panel B of Figure 1 contains a similar 
analysis of the dependence on the value of  ρ  of the three elasticities of demand for marijuana with 
respect to the price of alcohol.  With the minor exception of the Marshallian elasticity for small 
values of  ρ , these cross elasticities are always positive (here the vertical scale is not inverted), 
indicating substitutabilty, and also increase with   ρ  .  Panel C gives the plots of the three own-





4. STOCHASTIC  VICE 
 
In the previous section, we derived several sets of price elasticities for a demand system for 
vice by allowing for varying degrees of consumer preference structures, as summarised in matrix 
(3.1).  A key parameter of that matrix is α, and we explored the implications of different values of 
this parameter by undertaking some limited sensitivity analysis.  In this section, we extend this 
analysis by introducing a simulation approach to formally quantify uncertainty regarding the 
structure of preferences, and the implied uncertainty in values of the demand elasticities.  The 
approach involves describing our uncertainty with subjective probability distributions of market 
data (the  i w ) and the basic preference parameters (the  ii j  and   θ ν ), based on all available prior 
information such as economic theory, published econometric estimates, and our subjective 
judgment.  The implied probability distributions for the elasticities, which are usually non-linear 
functions of the basic parameters, are then obtained through Monte Carlo simulation.  The 
uncertainty regarding the demand elasticities can further be translated to probability statements 
regarding own- and cross-industry impacts in any policy analysis.  An advantage of the approach is 
that any inequality constraints required by economic theory or subjective beliefs can be imposed 
easily through simulation.  Subjective probability distributions and the simulation techniques   18
described above are typically used in modern Bayesian analysis (see, for example, Geweke, 
1999).
13   
The basic ingredients for the simulation are the four budget and marginal shares, the income 
flexibility and the correlation coefficient  ρ.  We shall assume that each of these 
variables/parameters follows a truncated normal distribution with the mean given by the relevant 
entry of Table 1 and a specified standard deviation.  Regarding the budget shares, for marijuana the 
mean of the distribution is  2 percent and we shall take the  95 percent confidence interval to be 1-3 
percent, which, on the basis of normality, implies a standard deviation of 0.5 percent, and a 
coefficient of variation of 0.5 / 2 = 25 percent.  Furthermore, we restrict the range of this share such 
that   1 0w 1 <<  .  This information is contained in the first row of Table 5.  For tobacco and 
alcohol, as consumption of these products is legal, it is reasonable to suppose that there is less 
uncertainty about their budget shares.  We thus specify their coefficients of variation to be 12.5 
percent, one half that of marijuana, as indicated in rows 2 and 3 of column 5 in Table 5.  We also 
restrict these shares to the [0, 1] interval.  As  
4
i i1w1 = = ∑  , all the information on the distribution of 
budget share of the fourth good, other, can be derived from that pertaining to the first three, and is 
recorded in row 4 of Table 5. 
The means of the distributions of   i θ   and  φ  are as specified in Table 1, while it is 
assumed additionally that the correlation coefficient  ρ  has mean of  -0.5 .  Regarding the standard 
deviations of these parameters, consider first the marginal shares   i θ  .  Due to their “unobservable” 
nature, we shall assume that there is twice as much uncertainty with respect to their values relative 
to that of the corresponding budget shares.  Thus, the coefficient of variation of   i θ   for marijuana is 
specified as 22 55 0 ×= percent, as indicated in column 5 and row 7 of Table 5.  A similar principle 
applies to the other three marginal shares.  Each   i θ   is also  constrained  to  lie  between  zero  and  
one,  and  the  four  shares  have a unit sum.  In our discussion in the previous section of prior 
estimates of  φ, it emerged that there was a certain “consensus” that the value of this parameter was 
of the order of  –0.5.  Accordingly, the coefficient of variation of  φ  is specified to be 25 percent, 
and its value is restricted to be negative.  In comparison with  φ , as there is considerable more 
uncertainty regarding the value of  ρ , we shall take its coefficient of variation to be 50 percent, 
                                                 
13 For examples of a similar approach in the context of equilibrium displacement models, see Griffiths and Zhao (2000) 
and Zhao et al. (2000). 
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while its range is restricted to be [-1, 0] .  This information is summarised in rows 5-10 of Table 5.  
Finally, as indicated by the last part of Table 5, the values of all the parameters are restricted such 
that the matrix  ν  is negative defined.  For each trial, we draw from eight univariate normal 
distributions with means and standard deviations as specified above.  These eight comprise three for 
the  i w (the fourth is determined by the constraint 
4
i i1w1 = = ∑ ), three for  i θ  (the fourth is again 
determined by 
4
i i1 1 = θ= ∑ ), one for φ and one for ρ.  If any of the constraints of column 6 of Table 
5 are violated, the trial is discarded.  The procedure is then repeated until there are 5,000 
realisations of each of the elements in the first ten rows of Table 5 and of  ν  that satisfy all the 
constraints.  We then use these values to calculate 5,000 values of the Frisch, Slustky and 
Marshallian elasticity matrices. 
The left-hand part of Table 6 summarises the results of the simulation by first providing for 
each of three types of price elasticities the means over the 5,000 trials and the associated standard 
deviations.  A comparison of the means of this part of the table with the corresponding elements of 
Table 4 reveals that they are quite close to their non-stochastic counterparts, which is reassuring.  
For tobacco, alcohol and other, the standard deviations of the own-price elasticities are all less than 
one half of the corresponding means; for marijuana, these standard deviations are relatively larger, 
which reflects the greater uncertainty surrounding this good.  Regarding the cross-price elasticities, 
in those cases when the elasticity is random the standard deviations are all less than the 
corresponding means, and the standard deviations in the non-marijuana rows are relatively smaller.  
Finally, the left-hand part of Panel D of Table 6 gives the means and standard deviations of the 
income elasticities of the four goods.  These are also in agreement with the Table 1 values, and the 
standard deviations of the non-marijuana elasticities are relatively smaller than those for marijuana. 
The above simulation takes the budget shares and the parameters to be all random. In 
principle at least, the true values of the budget shares are directly observable.  While there are 
issues associated with sampling procedures, and incentives for producers and consumers to 
systematically underreport (especially for marijuana, but also for tobacco and alcohol), these are 
just practical problems  that  could  be  resolved  with  sufficient  resources  and ingenuity.  The 
parameters of the demand equations,  φ ,  ρ  and   i θ  , are in a completely different category as 
their true values are inherently unobservable, no matter how much high-quality data we have.  The 
best we can do is to obtain econometric estimates of these parameters.  But as even if we had 
perfect data, these estimates are subject to estimation error due to random factors associated with   20
model uncertainty, it is plausible to suppose that relative to the budget shares, there is more 
uncertainty with respect to the values of the parameters.  The recognition of this distinction between 
variables and parameters was the basis of the above approach of specifying the coefficients of 
variation of the   i w   as being one half those of the corresponding   i θ  .  To pursue this idea further, 
we redo the previous simulation experiment with budget shares taken to be nonrandom.  A further 
reason for treating the   i w   as fixed is that their reciprocals appear in the expressions for the 
elasticities.  When   i w   is random there is some probability that in a certain trial it will take a very 
small value, causing the corresponding elasticity to “explode”.  Accordingly, fixing   i w   avoids the 
problem.
14 Thus in the second experiment, the values of the   i w   are held fixed in each trial at those 
given in rows 1-4 of column 2 of Table 5, while the parameters are drawn from univariate normal 
distributions with the same means and standard deviations as before.  The results are summarised in 
the right-hand part of Table 6 and, as can be seen, the means are close to those of the previous 
experiment, while in nearly all cases the standard deviations are lower, as is to be expected.  The 
standard deviations of the price elasticities in the marijuana rows fall on average by about 25 
percent, while the reduction in the other rows is of the order of 10 percent. 
Figures 2 and 3 give the frequency distributions for each price elasticity from the two 
experiments.  To facilitate understanding, these figures are presented in a commodity × commodity 
format, like the matrices of Table 6.  Thus, for example, the frequency in the top right-hand corner 
of Panel A of Figure 2, in the marijuana “row” and “column”, refers to the Frisch own-price 
elasticity of demand for marijuana when everything is taken to be random.  The frequencies are all 
unimodel, but many exhibit substantial asymmetry.  A case can be made that in Figure 2 the degree 
of asymmetry is greater (smaller) in the marijuana (other) rows.  As the elasticities all involve the 
reciprocals of the budget shares, this result could possibly reflect the relatively high (low) standard 
deviation of the marijuana (other) share.  This interpretation would seem to be supported by the 
distributions presented in Figure 3, where the budget shares are not random, as here the contrast 
between marijuana and the other three goods is not quite so stark.  Figure 4 contains the 
corresponding distributions for the income elasticities.  As these elasticities are the ratios of 
marginal shares   i θ   to the corresponding budget shares   i w  , in Panel B of this figure, where the  
i θ   are normal and   i w   fixed, the distributions are all normal by construction. 
                                                 
14 A related issue is that ratios of normal variables do not possess finite moments. See, e.g., Bewley and Fiebig (1990) 
and Zellner (1978).   21
As a final way to “visualise” our approach, we consider the demand curve for marijuana.  
From Table A2 of the Appendix, per capita expenditure on marijuana in 1998 was $372, while 
consumption was 0.7873 ounces per capita (Clements and Daryal, 2005a), so that the implicit price 
is 372/0.7872 = $473 per ounce.  These price-quantity values are represented by the point A in 
Figure 5, and we take this point as lying on the demand curve.  The other points on the demand 
curve can be derived as follows.  We return to the differential demand equation (2.1) for  i = 1  (for 
marijuana), divide both sides by  1 w , hold real income and all non-marijuana prices constant to 
yield   () () 11 1 1 dl o g q dl o g p , =η where  ( ) 11 11 1 1 1 w η= ν− φ θ θ   is the Slutsky own-price elasticity of 
demand for marijuana.  Denote the observed price and quantity by a second “0” subscript, so that 
10 10 p 473, q 0.7872, ==  and unobserved “new” values by   1* 1* p   and  q .  Accordingly,   
() () 1* 10 11 1* 10 log q q log p p =η ,   s o  t h a t    ( ) 11 0 1 1 1 1 0 qq e x p l o g p p . ••   =η     As this equation 
expresses the new quantity in terms of the new price  1* p , the other points on the demand curve are 
obtained by varying  1* p .  To allow for uncertainty in the parameters and data, for each value of   1* p  
we use the 5,000 values of the elasticity  11 η  described above, where everything is random, and the 
results are presented in Figure 6.
15  This shows that the precision of the demand curve decreases 
substantially as we move away from the observed price-quantity configuration.  This can be seen 
even more clearly in the associated distributions of consumption conditional on the price, which are 
given in Figure 7.  As can be seen from Panel B, when the price is $500, which is close to that 
prevailing in 1998, the consumption distribution is fairly compact around the mean of 0.76 oz, and 
the standard deviation is 0.02 oz.  But when the price rises to $800, 60 percent above the status quo, 
the distribution moves to the left, with mean consumption falling to 0.57, while its dispersion 
increases substantially, as indicated by the standard deviation of 0.11.
16 
 
5. ILLUSTRATIVE  APPLICATIONS 
 
To illustrate the application of our approach, in this section we use it to consider the impact 
of a reduction in marijuana prices and changes in taxation arrangements pertaining to vice.  As this 
                                                 
15 Figure 5 is derived by plotting for each value of   *1 p   the mean over the 5,000 trials of the corresponding quantity 
demanded   1* q   . 
16 As a check, we use the means given in Panels B and C of this figure to derive a price elasticity of 
() () log .57 .76 log 800 500 .29 .47 0.6 ≈− ≈− .  This value agrees with the relevant elasticity given in Table 6.   22
analysis is only illustrative, we abstract from the supply side by assuming infinitely elastic supply 
schedules, so that all price and tax changes are passed onto consumers in their entirety; see 
Appendix 2 for a discussion of the issues involved.  Table 7 gives the basic information on pre-
existing taxation and consumption that will be used subsequently.  As can be seen, tax accounts for 
about 54 percent of the consumer price for tobacco and 41 percent for alcohol. 
Changes in Marijuana Prices and Taxation of Tobacco and Alcohol 
Suppose marijuana prices were to fall by 10 percent because of productivity enhancement in 
the production of marijuana and/or a reduced policing effort in enforcing pre-existing laws 
prohibiting its consumption.
17  The change in consumption of good  i  as a result of a change in the 
price of good  j  is 
(5.1)               ii j j d(logq ) d(logp ) = η , 
where   ij i j (logq )/ (logp ) η= ∂ ∂   is one version of the  (i, j)
th  price elasticity.  To implement 
equation (5.1) for marijuana, alcohol and tobacco  (i = 1, 2, 3), we set  j = 1 , so that 
j1 d(logp ) d(logp ) log(1 0.1) == − , representing a 10 percent fall in the price of marijuana, and 
interpret the price elasticity as the Slutsky version.  We then use in equation (5.1) the previous 
5,000 simulated values of   i1 η , which yields 5,000 values of   i d(logq ).  The first three elements of 
column 2 of Table 8 give the mean and standard deviation of consumption for each good.  Mean 
consumption for each good is simply the mean of the elasticity, from the left-hand part of Panel B 
of Table 6, times  log0.9 . 
What happens to revenue from taxation as a result of the fall in the price of marijuana?  As 
marijuana escapes the tax net,  there  is  no  direct  effect,  but  there  are  indirect  effects  due  to its 
interactions in consumption with tobacco and alcohol, which are taxed.  Because marijuana and 
tobacco are complements, the fall in the price of marijuana stimulates tobacco consumption, which 
raises tax revenue.  Offsetting this is the reduced tax revenue from alcohol, the consumption of 
which falls as it is a substitute for marijuana.  The impact on taxation total revenue from vice then 
depends on the relative magnitudes of these two effects.  To analyse these effects in detail, let   i p′  
be the producer (or pre-tax) price of good  i ,   i p   be the corresponding consumer (or post-tax) price 
and   i t′  be the tax rate expressed as a proportion of  i p′,  so that   ii i p (1 t ) p ′′ = + .  Taxation revenue 
                                                 
17 Over the 1990s, the relative price of marijuana fell in Australia by about 40 percent (Clements, 2004).   23
from  i  is then   i iii iii Rt p qt p q ′′ ==, where   ii i tt / ( 1 t ) ′ ′ = +   is the tax rate as a proportion of the 
consumer price.  The change in tax revenue is then   iiii d(logR ) d(logt ) d(logp ) d(logq ) , or = ++  
(5.2)                iiii d(logR ) d(logt ) d(logp ) d(logq ) ′ ′ = ++. 
Total tax revenue from vice is   23 RR R =+ ,  or in change form 
(5.3)                23 d(logR) d(logR ) (1 )d(logR ) =γ + −γ , 
where   2 R/ R γ=   is the share of tobacco in total tax revenue.   
When marijuana prices fall by 10 percent, then with everything else unchanged, it follows 
from equation (5.2) that   ii d(logR ) d(logq ) for i 2, 3 = = , so that revenue is proportional to 
consumption.  Accordingly,  the elements in rows 4 and 5 of column 2 of Table 8, which give 
i d(logR ), are identical to those in rows 2 and 3 of the same column.  Equation (5.3) gives the 
change in total revenue as a weighted average of the changes in revenue from tobacco and alcohol.  
To implement this equation, we use for the share of tobacco in total revenue   0.47 γ=  , which 
follows from row 3 of Table 7.  Row 6 of column 2 of Table 8 reveals that averaging over the 5,000 
trials, total revenue increases by 0.3 percent as a result of the 10 percent reduction in marijuana 
prices.   
In the above simulation we used the Slutsky elasticities, which amount to holding real 
income constant.  Alternatively, we could hold money income constant and allow real income to 
rise with the fall in marijuana prices, and redo the simulations with the Marshallian elasticities.  The 
elements of row 7-12 of column 2 of Table 8 give the results with the Marshallian elasticities and, 
as can be seen, these are fairly similar to the previous set of results.  The choice of which set of 
elasticities to use depends on the nature of the exogenous change:  If it is something that just 
reshuffles the pre-existing resources of the economy, as would be the case following a change in 
taxation arrangements, then since there would be no first-order income effects of such a change, it 
is appropriate to use the Slutsky elasticities.  Alternatively, a productivity improvement raises real 
incomes and the Marshallian elasticities should be used.  However, the differences in the results are 
fairly modest in this case.  As the same is true in the subsequent simulations, in what follows we 
shall concentrate on the results with the Slutsky elasticities.
18 
                                                 
18 The detailed results for the Marshallian case are given in Panel II of Table 8.   24
Next, consider the effects of increasing taxation of tobacco and alcohol.  For tobacco, the 
tax rate of 54 percent of consumer prices implies a tax of 119 percent of pre-tax prices, so that if we 
increase it by 10 percentage points to 129 percent,   2 t′   then increases by 8.4 percent.  As   
ii i p (1 t ) p ′′ =+ , the change in the consumer price is 











To apply this equation for  i = 2  (tobacco), we use   22 dt 0.1 and t 1.19 ′ ′ = = .  We then substitute 
the right-hand side of equation (5.4) for   j d(logp )  in equation (5.1), use the 5,000 elasticities, and 
compute the means and standard deviations of consumption, as before.  The results are given in the 
first three entries of column 3 of Table 8. 
What happens to tax revenue following this tax increase?   When the producer price   i p′  is 
held constant, equation (5.2) implies the change in revenue from  i  is 











with   ii i ii i i i d(logq ) d(logp ) dt /(1 t ) ′′ =η =η + , which follows from equations (5.1) and (5.4).  We 
implement equation (5.5) for tobacco, by setting   22 dt 0.1 and t 1.19 ′ ′ = = , as before.  The change 
in alcohol tax revenue following the increase in tobacco taxes is   33 2 2 2 d(logR ) dt /(1 t ) ′′ =η +  , from 
equations (5.1), (5.2) and (5.4), while the evolution of total taxes is given by equation (5.3).  Rows 
4-6 of column 3 of Table 8 give the results of the increase in the tobacco tax obtained by applying 
the same procedure as that used above.  As can be seen, total taxes increase by about 3.7 percent, 
with a standard deviation of 0.16 percent. 
Column 4 of Table 8 gives the results of increasing alcohol taxes by 10 percentage points.  
As the pre-existing tax rate is   3 t 100 41 ×=   percent or   3 t 100 70 ′ × =   percent, such an increase 
translates to a 14 percent rise.  To put the point another way, when both tax rates rise by 10 
percentage points, equation (5.4) implies that consumer prices of tobacco increase by about   
10/2.19 4.6 =   percent, while those of alcohol increase by  10/1.70 5.9 =   percent.  It is thus not 
surprising that the results pertaining to alcohol in column 4, for the alcohol tax increase, are 
substantially larger than those pertaining to tobacco of column 3, which refer to the tobacco tax 
increase.  We can put the two tax increases on a more equal footing by increasing each of the rates   25
by 10 percent, and the results are contained in columns 5 and 6 of Table 8.  Now the increase in 
total revenue is approximately equal in the two cases at about 4 percent, as can be seen from row 6 
of columns 5 and 6. 
In the previous section, we argued that there was some merit in treating the budget shares as 
fixed in each trial.  We can apply this approach to the present simulations, and columns 7 to 11 of 
Table 8 contain the results.  An element-by-element comparison shows that the mean for each case 
is approximately the same whether or not the budget share is random.  As is to be expected 
however, the standard deviations fall when the budget shares are fixed, especially those in the two 
rows involving marijuana. 
Taxing Marijuana 
Suppose marijuana were legalised and its consumption taxed.  The legalisation of marijuana 
itself could shift its supply and demand curves and lead to a reshuffling of the vice budget; for an 
analysis of these issues, see Appendix 2.  But to keep things as simple as possible, we shall ignore 
these “legalisation effects” on production and consumption and focus on the opportunities to tax 
marijuana and its implications.  We commence with an investigation of the likely revenue available 
from taxing marijuana, and then proceed to consider the implications of redistributing the additional 
revenue to vice consumers in the form of lower alcohol taxes.  Again, it is to be emphasised that the 
analysis is only illustrative of the capabilities of the approach. 
We need to consider two situations, before and after the change in taxation arrangements, to 
be denoted by the superscript   0a n d 1 τ= τ= , respectively.  To keep the notation as clear as 
possible, the  τ  superscript will be placed in parentheses, so that  
()
i R
τ   is the revenue from taxing 
good  i  in situation (or period)  τ,   0, 1 τ= .  If 
()
i t
τ ′  is the tax rate on  i  in  τ ,   i p′  its pre-tax price 
(assumed to be constant throughout) and 
()
i q
τ   is the corresponding quantity demand, then   
() () ()
ii i i Rt p q




= =∑ .  It follows from  
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j1 ii j j d(logq ) d(logp ) = ∑ =η  
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(1) (0) (0)
jj j i dl o g p t t 1 t ′′ ′ =− +  that consumption of good  i  after the tax change can be 
expressed as   
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As marijuana is initially untaxed, 
(0)
1 t0 ′ = , and we impose a tax on it at rate 
(1)
1 t′ , while 
holding the pre-existing rates on tobacco and alcohol constant, so that 
(1) (0)
jj tt , j 2 , 3 ′′ == .  Equation 
(5.6) then defines the new base, and we use various values of the marijuana tax rate to evaluate 
revenue with the 5,000 values of the elasticity, in exactly the same manner as before.  Table 9 gives 
the results for revenue in the form of means over the 5,000 trials.  As can be seen, the tax yields a 
nontrivial amount of revenue; for example, a 30 percent rate yields about $86 per capita p. a., which 
represents additional revenue of about one quarter of the pre-existing revenue from tobacco.  But as 
tobacco is a complement for marijuana, increasing the tax on the latter causes tobacco revenue to 
fall, as shown by column 3 of Table 9:  The 30 percent marijuana tax causes proceeds from tobacco 
to fall from $324 to $303, a reduction of about 6 percent.  Substitutability with alcohol causes 
alcohol revenue to rise with the marijuana tax, but as can be seen from column 4 of Table 9, this 
rise is quite modest at about 4 percent for a 30 percent marijuana tax.  The net effect of these 
changes on total receipts from vice taxation is given in column 5, which for a 30 percent marijuana 
tax rises from $684 to $764, or about 12 percent.
19  There are two noticeable patterns in the revenue 
standard errors.  Relative to mean revenue, the standard deviations all rise with the marijuana tax 
rate, and the marijuana standard deviations are all substantially larger than those of tobacco and 
alcohol.  This reflects the greater uncertainty of the impacts of a tax regime that is more distant 
from the pre-existing one, as well as the greater uncertainty of the underlying data and parameters 
pertaining to marijuana.  Figure 8 plots revenue against the marijuana tax rate and as it has a 
(gentle) inverted U-shape, it could be described as a type of “Laffer curve”.  As can be seen, the 
revenue-maximising tax rate is in the vicinity of 50 percent.
20  Panel B of Figure 8 illustrates the 
                                                 
19 The issue of estimating possible revenues from taxing marijuana in a legalised environment has been considered 
previously in several other studies (Bates, 2004, Caputo and Ostrom, 1994, Easton, 2004, Miron, 2005, and Schwer et 
al., 2002).  In what seems to be the most widely-cited paper in this area, Caputo and Ostrom (1994) estimate that for the 
US it would be possible to raise $US3-5 billion from marijuana taxation in 1991.  This estimate is based on 
conservative assumptions regarding the continued existence after legalisation of a black market that avoided the tax.  
For comparison, in the same year tax revenue from tobacco and alcohol combined was $22b (roughly evenly split 
between tobacco and alcohol).  Using the mid-point of the above range of $4b, the marijuana tax would thus represent 
an addition of about 18 percent to revenue from vice taxation.  As shown in the sixth element of column 2 of our Table 
9, we estimate that the maximum revenue from taxing marijuana in Australia is about $A105 per capita, or about  
105/684 ≈ 15 percent of pre-existing revenue from vice.  Accordingly, our estimates seem to be in broad agreement 
with those of Caputo and Ostrom (1994).  In a more recent US study, Miron (2005) estimates that marijuana could 
generate about $US2b p.a. if taxed at the same rate as other goods, or $6b if taxed at a rate comparable to that on 
tobacco and alcohol.  Miron argues that these figures are similar to the earlier revenue estimates of Caputo and Ostrom 
(1994).  
20 Revenue from marijuana is   ( )
(1) (1) (0) (1)
11 1 1 1 1 1 Rt p q e x p t ′′ ′ =η , so that the first-order condition for a maximum is 
()( )
(1) (0) (1)
11 1 1 1 11 1
(1) (1)
11 R 1t p q e x p t 0 t ∂∂ ′′ ′ =+ ηη = ′ .  Accordingly, the revenue-maximizing tax is 
(1)*
11 1 t1 / ′ = η .  The corresponding tax   27
underlying uncertainty of the tax revenues by presenting a type of “fan chart” (Britton et al., 1998, 
Wallis, 1999) in which the darker colours denote values that have a higher probability of 
occurrence.  This shows clearly how revenue uncertainty increases with the marijuana tax rate. 
Next, we analyse some of the implications of the additional revenue by considering an 
offsetting reduction in alcohol taxes that serves to keep constant total tax collections from vice.  
That is, we shall keep tobacco taxes unchanged and consider a revenue-neutral reduction in alcohol 
taxes associated with the new tax on marijuana, so that the marijuana tax dividend is given to 
drinkers in the form of lower taxes.  Our problem is to specify the marijuana tax rate at some fixed 
value, say  
(1)
11 ˆ tt ′′ = , and solve for the revenue-neutral reduction in alcohol taxes.  More formally, 
the problem is to find the new tax on alcohol,  
(1)
3 t′  , that satisfies the following conditions: 
(i)   
(0)
1 t0 ′ =     [Marijuana is initially tax free] 
(ii)  
(1)
11 ˆ tt ′′ =     [Marijuana is now taxed at rate 
*
1 t′ ] 
(iii) 
(1) (0)
22 tt ′′ =    [Tobacco continues to be taxed at the same rate] 
(iv)  
(1) (0) RR =   [Total tax revenue is unchanged] . 
Details of the numerical solution to this problem are contained in Appendix 3.  Panel A of Figure 9 
gives this tradeoff by averaging over the 5,000 trials as before.  As can be seen, the tradeoff is 
negatively-sloped, but since the curve tends to get flatter as the marijuana tax increases, the tradeoff 
worsens as we move down the curve.  This is due to two reasons.  (1) Because the higher marijuana 
tax causes its consumption (the tax base) to be lower, a further increase in the rate generates a 
smaller increment to revenue; and this smaller amount of additional revenue is then redistributed in 
the form of a smaller reduction of alcohol taxes, resulting in the flattening out of the tradeoff.  
When the marijuana tax exceeds the revenue-maximising rate, the slope of the tradeoff switches to 
positive (but this cannot be easily seen from Figure 9).  (2) As it is a substitute for marijuana, 
alcohol consumption rises with a higher marijuana tax, so that the reduction in the alcohol tax rate 
required to just absorb the additional revenue from marijuana is smaller, which contributes to the 
flattening out of the curve.
21  The slope of the tradeoff (again averaged over the 5,000 trials) is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
as a proportion of the consumer price is   ( ) ()
(1)* (1)* (1)*
11 1 1 1 tt1 t 1 1 ′′ =+ = − η .  Using the mean elasticity of  
11 0.64 η= −  , 
(1)*
1 t0 . 6 =  .  
In view of the approximation involved in using means (ignoring Jensen’s inequality), this value seems in reasonable 
agreement with the revenue-maximising rate of Figure 8. 
21 It is to be noted that along the tradeoff not only does consumption of alcohol and marijuana change, but so also does 
that of tobacco.  As tobacco and marijuana are complements, an increase in the marijuana tax lowers tobacco 
consumption and taxation revenue from this good; and because tobacco and alcohol are substitutes, a lowering of the   28
given in Panel B of Figure 9.  This reveals that for rates of taxation of marijuana of 20 percent for 
example, the tradeoff is approximately 1:2, so that a two-percentage-point increase in the marijuana 
tax is associated with almost a one-percentage-point reduction in the alcohol tax.  This reflects 
primarily the differences in the tax bases of the two goods, and to a lesser extent, differences in 
their price elasticities.  But as the marijuana tax increases from 20 percent to, say, 30 percent, the 
slope of the curve falls (in absolute value), from 0.47 to 0.42. 
As the tradeoff of Figure 9 is the mean over the 5,000 trials, it represents the centre-of-
gravity effects.  But to understand the underlying uncertainty of these effects, we need to examine 
other aspects of the simulation results, such as the frequencies given in Figure 10.  These show that 
the nature of the tradeoff is reasonably well defined for low rates of marijuana taxation, but 
uncertainty increases with the tax rate.  This, of course, is to be expected as increased marijuana 
taxation involves a move away from its current tax-free status to something that has not been 
previously observed.  Note from Panel B of Figure 10 there is a hint that high rates of taxation 
cause the slope to become positive, as the revenue-maximising rate is exceeded.  Finally, we 
consider the distribution of the alcohol tax conditional on the marijuana tax by analysing cross 
sections of the “vice mountain” of Figure 10.  The left-hand side of Panel A of Figure 11 presents 
the conditional distribution when marijuana is taxed at 10 percent.  As can be seen, the mean 
alcohol tax is about 35 percent, while the standard deviation of the 5,000 trials is 1 percentage 
points.  As the marijuana tax is increased to 20 and 30 percent, the mean alcohol tax falls to 30 and 
26 percent, respectively, and the standard deviation rises to 1.5 and 2.6 percentage points, as shown 
in Panels B and C of the figure.  The increased dispersion of the distribution clearly reflects the 
greater uncertainty of the alcohol tax as we move further away from the status quo of not taxing 
marijuana.  This phenomenon is also reflected in the conditional distribution of the slope of the 
tradeoff, given on the right-hand side of Figure 11. 
 
6. CONCLUDING  COMMENTS 
 
This paper has considered the generic problem of how to analyse the demand for a product 
for which there is little information available in the form of hard data and its price responsiveness.  
To deal this problem, we introduced procedures that (i) draw on the interactions in consumption 
                                                                                                                                                                  
alcohol tax also leads to reduced revenue from tobacco.  Accordingly, as we move down the tradeoff, revenue from 
taxing tobacco falls unambiguously.  By construction, along the tradeoff these changes in revenue from tobacco are 
“neutralised” by offsetting changes in the alcohol tax which serve to keep overall taxation revenue constant.   29
between the products with others and (ii) organise whatever information there is available in the 
form of subjective probability distributions.  We applied these procedures to the demand for 
marijuana, a product for which there exists no official data available, and only fragmentary 
evidence on its price responsiveness, mainly based on survey information.  But as marijuana 
consumption is known to be related to tobacco and alcohol usage, we were able to exploit some of 
this prior knowledge by using a system-wide demand model that considers all three goods 
simultaneously.  To organise this knowledge efficiently, we started with a differential demand 
system that has strong links with the structure of the consumer’s preferences, and then proceeded to 
derive the associated price elasticites.  As the utility-based parameters of the demand system are 
random, reflecting the uncertainty regarding their true values, the price elasitcities have probability 
distributions, which we derived via Monte Carlo simulations.  In other situations where little data 
are available, our procedures could also be useful.  For example, they could be used to analyse the 
determinants of the consumption of other illicit goods, new goods, or goods that have been 
substantially “reconfigured”. 
To illustrate some applications of the approach, we carried out several price/tax simulations.  
For example, we considered the hypothetical legalisation of the consumption of marijuana, which 
was then subject to taxation.  The tax has the effect of inhibiting marijuana usage, stimulating 
drinking (as alcoholic beverages are a substitute for marijuana) and reducing the smoking of 
tobacco (a complement for marijuana).  However, the net effect is for revenue from vice taxation to 
increase with the marijuana tax up until the rate hits about 50 percent of consumer prices (or about 
100 percent of producer prices).  We estimate that the maximum revenue attainable from taxing 
marijuana is equivalent to about 15 percent of pre-existing revenue from vice.  Next, we analysed 
by how much alcohol taxes could be reduced if the marijuana tax dividend were used in a revenue-
neutral tax tradeoff.  For modest rates of marijuana taxation, this resulted in a rough rule of one-
half: For each percentage-point increase in the marijuana tax, alcohol taxation could be reduced by 
about one-half of a percentage point.  For higher marijuana tax rates, as marijuana consumption 
falls and drinking increases, the tradeoff worsens and successive increases in the marijuana tax 
allow only smaller and smaller reductions in alcohol taxes.  The attractive feature of our approach is 
that it provides the whole distribution of the alcohol tax corresponding to each rate of marijuana 
taxation.  The dispersion of this distribution, which reflects the underlying uncertainty concerning 
data and parameters, has the reasonable property that it increases as we move away from the status 




Table A1 provides Australian data on the expenditure on the three alcoholic beverages -- 
beer, wine and spirits -- as well as total alcohol.  As can be seen from Panel B, in the late 1990s 
beer absorbs slightly more than one half of total spending on alcohol, while the reminder is split 
roughly equally between wine and spirits.  Table A2 gives the corresponding data for marijuana and 
tobacco, and compares this with alcohol and total consumption expenditure.  The quantity data for 
marijuana is estimated on the basis of the Australian National Drug Strategy Household Survey 
(various issues), together with some plausible assumptions that link intensity of use to frequency of 
use; see Clements and Daryal (2005) for details.  Although all care was taken in preparing these 
estimates, and they are not inconsistent with independent estimates, it must be acknowledged that 
they are likely to be subject to a substantial margin of error.  The marijuana prices have been 
described by Clements (2004) as follows: 
The data on Australian marijuana prices were generously supplied by Mark Hazell of the 
Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence.  These prices were collected by law enforcement 
agencies in the various states and territories during undercover buys.  In general, the data are 
quarterly and refer to the period 1990-1999, for each state and territory.  The different types of 
marijuana identified separately are leaf, heads, hydroponics, skunk, hash resin and hash oil.  
However, we focus on only the prices of “leaf” and “heads”, as these products are the most 
popular.  The data are described by Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (1996) who 
discuss some difficulties with them regarding different recording practices used by the various 
agencies and missing observations.  While it is unlikely that these data constitute a random 
sample, a common problem when studying the prices of almost any illicit good, it is not clear 
that they would be biased either upwards or downwards.  In any event, they are the only data 
available. 
The prices are usually recorded in the form of ranges and the basic data are listed in 
Clements and Daryal (2001).  The data are “consolidated” by: (i) Using the mid-point of each 
price range; (ii) converting all gram prices to ounces by multiplying by 28; and (iii) annualising 
the data by averaging the quarterly or semi-annual observations.  Annualising has the effect of 
reducing the considerable noise in the quarterly/semi-annual data.  Plotting the data revealed 
several outliers which probably reflect some of the above-mentioned recording problems.   
Observations are treated as outliers if they are either less than one-half of the mean for the 
corresponding state, or greater than twice the mean.  This rule led to five outlying observations 
which are omitted and replaced with the relevant means, based on the remaining observations. 
For a listing of the price data, after consolidation and editing, see Clements (2004). 
The last column of Panel B of Table A2 presents the budget share of vice -- the sum of 
marijuana, tobacco and alcohol -- and, interestingly, this has declined noticeably over the decade of 
the 1990s.  This share was 13.4 percent in 1988 and fell by more than 5 percentage points to end up   31
at 7.8 percent in 1998.  A large part of this fall is accounted for by the decline in the share of 
tobacco, which fell by almost 4 percentage points.   32
APPENDIX 2 
 
NOTES ON LEGALISATION, TAXES AND MARIJAUAN PRICES 
 
In the text, we considered the scenario of legalising the consumption and production of 
marijuana and then subjecting it to varying degrees of taxation.  We supposed that this would lead 
to the consumer price of marijuana increasing by the full amount of the tax, implying that (i) 
legalisation without taxation would have the effect of leaving the price unchanged and (ii) all of the 
tax is borne by consumers.
22  While this approach has the merit of simplicity, it is not the only 
possibility, and in this appendix we explore the issues involved. 
Following Miron (2005), we can analyse the change in the price resulting from legalisation 
by reference to the relative shifts of the marijuana demand and supply curves.  According to the 
“forbidden fruit” hypothesis, legalisation makes marijuana less attractive and shifts the demand 
curve down and to the left, as in panel A of Figure 12.  Evidence on this hypothesis from the 
experience with decriminalisation (which could be thought of as a weak form of legalisation) in 
(predominantly) the states of the US is mixed: Studies using data pertaining to the whole population 
(Cameron and Williams, 2001, Model, 1993, Saffer and Chaloupka, 1995, 1998) find a significant 
increase in marijuana consumption due to decriminalisation.
23  By contrast, three other studies 
involving youths only (Johnston et al., 1981, Pacula, 1997, Theis and Register, 1993) find that 
decriminalisation has no significant impact.  Evidently, as the general population consume less 
marijuana than do the young, their consumption is more sensitive to changes in its legal status.  On 
the basis of a survey of university students, Daryal (2002) finds that on average consumption would 
increase modestly with legalisation.   
Regarding the supply curve, Miron (1998, 2005) argues on a priori grounds that legalisation 
could shift it either up or down, as shown in panel B of Figure 12.  With legalisation, producers 
would no longer be forced to incur costs associated with concealing their activities to avoid 
prosecution, causing the supply curve to shift down and to the right.  On the other hand however, 
legalisation would also mean that producers would have to pay taxes and charges, and comply with 
all regulations that legitimate businesses are subject to.  Additionally, marijuana producers would 
possibly have to incur advertising expenses if the product were legalised.  These effects would 
cause the supply curve to shift up and to the left. 
                                                 
22 There is also the possibility of some combination of a rise in the pre-tax price with legalisation, coupled with just the 
right amount of the tax (less than 100 percent) being borne by consumers, leading to the same result.  As this would 
seem to be an unlikely possibility, we do not consider it further. 
23 It is to be noted, however, Cameron and Williams (2001) find the increase in consumption to be only temporary.   33
The net effect of these shifts in the demand and supply curves on prices is ambiguous as is 
illustrated in panel C of Figure 12 for the simplified case in which the demand curve remains 
unchanged.  This ambiguity can only be resolved with empirical evidence.  While such evidence is 
not easy to obtain, Miron (2005) argues that on the basis of a comparison of marijuana prices in the 
US, where restrictions are stronger, and Australian and The Netherlands, where they are weaker, the 
net effect on prices likely to be quite small.  Another piece of evidence that points in the same 
direction is Miron’s (2003) finding on the basis of an extremely detailed and careful analysis that 
markups from “farmgate” to consumers of heroin and cocaine are substantially smaller than 
previously thought; in fact, he finds these markups to be not massively larger than those of legal 
goods such as chocolate, coffee and tea.  On the basis of other evidence, Miron (2003, p. 529) 
estimates “that the black market price of cocaine is 2-4 times the price that would obtain in a legal 
market, and of heroin 6-19 times.  In contrast, prior research has suggested that cocaine sells at 10 
to 40 times its legal price and heroin at hundreds of times its legal price.”  The smaller markups 
could be taken to imply that as the illicit nature of these drugs per se has only a limited (or a more 
limited than previously thought) impact on prices, the price effects of legalisation would likewise be 
limited.
24  Consistent with this line of thinking is research which shows that increased enforcement 
of drug laws does not seem to result in higher prices (DiNardo, 1993, Weatherburn and Lind, 1997, 
Yuan and Caulkins, 1998). 
The response of the consumer price to the imposition of the tax relates to the incidence of 
the tax.  The economic incidence of a tax is independent of its legal incidence (in the sense of who 
writes the cheque for the tax), and in a partial equilibrium framework it is shared between producers 
and consumers, depending on the value of the price elasticity of supply relative to the price 
elasticity of demand.  In the special case in which supply is infinitely elastic, producers escape all 
the burden of the tax, and consumers pay 100 percent in the form of higher prices; that is, in this 
situation the tax is completely passed onto consumers.  Although it is difficult to argue 
convincingly that this accurately describes the supply side of the marijuana market, the ease with 
which it can be cultivated with hydoponic techniques, the ready availability of the required 
technology, and the lack of specialised inputs -- remembering that we are considering a legalised 
regime -- all point in the direction of the elasticity of supply being high.  Accordingly, the 
assumption that all of the tax is borne by consumers may not be too bad as a first approximation; 
                                                 
24 Miron (1999) provides another piece of evidence with his study of the impact of prohibition on alcohol consumption 
in the United States during 1920-33.  Using the death rate from liver cirrhosis as a proxy for alcohol consumption, he 
finds that prohibition “exerted a modest and possibly even positive effect on consumption.”  This could be because 
prices fell for reasons given above.  But there are other possibilities including a highly inelastic demand for alcohol 
and/or prohibition giving alcohol the status of a “forbidden fruit” (Miron, 1999).   34
but of course to the extent to which the elasticity is less than infinite, some of the tax would be 
absorbed by producers and our results would overstate its impact on consumers.   35
APPENDIX 3 
 
NUMERICAL ASPECTS OF THE MARIJUANA-ALCOHOL TAX TRADEOFF 
 
This appendix sets out the details of the numerical analysis regarding the tradeoff between 
marijuana and alcohol taxes.  With the introduction of the marijuana tax at the rate of  
(1)
1 t′  , our 
objective is to obtain the new alcohol tax rate 
(1)
3 t′  that keeps the total tax revenue from vice 
constant.   
The tax base of good  i  under the new tax regime, 
(1)
i q ,  is given by equation (5.6).  We can 
express tax revenue from marijuana in terms of producer prices as  
(1) (1) (1)
ii ii i Rt p q ′ ′ =  .  As we possess 
the base-period consumption of tobacco and alcohol and assume that their prices do not change, it is 
convenient to express tax revenues from these two goods in terms of consumer prices.  We then set 
the total tax revenue from vice under the new regime, 
(1) R , equal to the previous total tax revenue, 
(0) R , i.e., 
(A1) 
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The constant tobacco tax rate, 
(1) (0)
22 tt ′′ = , makes the second term in the summation of each of the 
exponential functions disappear.  This also leads to 
(1) (0)
22 t t 0.543 ==  (from Table 7).  We also 
obtain 
(0) R 684 =  from Table 7 and the following base-period consumption expenditures: 
(0)
11 p q 372 ′ = , 
(0)
22 p q 597 = , 
(0)
33 p q 879 = .  Substituting 
(1) (1) (1)
33 3 tt / ( 1 t ) ′ ′ =+  into equation (A1), we see 
that revenue is a function of only two unknown variables 
(1) (1)
13 ta n d t ′ ′ .  Thus if we define the 
function  
(1) (0) gR R =−,  the alcohol-marijuana tax tradeoff takes the form  ()
(1) (1)
13 gg t, t; 0 ′′ == θ ,  
where  θ  refers to the remaining known variables from Table 7 and the elasticities.  To be explicit, 
(A2) 
(1) (0) (1) (0)
(1) (1) (1) 33 33




31 1 33 (1) (0)
33
tt tt
g t 372 exp t .543 597 exp t
1t 1t
tt t
879 exp t 684 0.
1t 1t
  ′′ ′′ −− ′′ ′ = × ×η+ η + × ×η+ η   ′′ ++  
 ′′ ′ − ′ +× × η + η − =  ′′ ++ 
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We specify the value of 
(1)
1 t′  in equation (A2) and increase it progressively from 0, 0.001, 
0.002, … .  For each value of  
(1)
1 t′  and each set of  i1 η ,  we solve for 
(1)
3 t′  in  ()
(1) (1)
13 gg t, t; 0 ′′ == θ .  
As  g( ) 0 = i   is nonlinear in 
(1)
3 t′ , its solution requires numerical methods.  We use a grid search to 
find the value of  
(1)
3 t′  that satisfies  g0 . 1 < .  Using approximation  exp(x) 1 x ≈+   for small  x ,  
new consumption of good  i  can be expressed as 
(1) (0) 3
jj (1) (0)





   ′′ −
=+ η     ′ +     
∑ . 
Instead of using equation (5.6), we substitute the above equation into the revenue expression (A1), 
so that the approximation to  gg ( ) = i ,  call it  gg ( ) ′ ′ = i ,  is now quadratic in 
(1)
3 t′ : 
(1) (0) (1) (0)
(1) (0) (1) (1) (0) (1) 33 33
1 1 11 1 1 1 3 2 2 22 1 1 2 3 (0) (0)
33
(1) (1) (0)
(0) (1) 33 3
33 3 1 1 3 3 (1) (0)
33
tt tt
gtp q1 t t p q1 t
1t 1t
tt t
pq 1 t .
1t 1t
  ′ ′′ ′ −− ′′′ ′ ′ =+ η + η + + η + η   ′′ ++  
 ′′ ′ − ′ ++ η + η  ′′ ++ 
 
There are two real roots for the equation g ( ) 0 ′ = i  when 
(1)
1 t′  is in the range of 0 and 0.61, which 
corresponds to the marijuana tax in terms of consumer prices 
(1)
1 t  being in the range of 0 and 0.38.  
We thus use the root that lies between 0 and 1 as the initial guess of 
(1)
3 t′  and then use a grid search 
to locate the solution of  g() 0 = i  .  This procedure converges fairly quickly.  For a given value of 
(1)
1 t 0.38 ′ ≤ , we use the 5,000 simulated values of   i1 η  described in the text to obtain 5,000 values of  
(1)
3 t′ .  In particular, we record the mean of 
(1)
3 t′  corresponding to  
(1)
1 t 0.38 ′ =   as 
(1)
3 t′    .  When 
(1)
1 t >0.38, as g() 0 ′ = i  has no real roots, we use  
(1)
3 t′    as the initial value in a grid search.  This 
procedure also converges reasonably quickly to the solution of original equation  g( ) 0 = i . 
Finally, we convert the tax rate as a proportion of the consumer price using 
()
(1) (1) (1)
33 3 tt1 t ′′ =+ . 
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TABLE 1 
BASIC DATA FOR VICE DEMAND 
Commodity 
Budget share 
i w ×100 
Income elasticity 
i η  
Marginal share 
i θ ×100 
      (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
Marijuana  2.0  1.2             2.4 
Tobacco  2.0  0.4             0.8 
Alcohol  4.0  1.0             4.0 
Other  92.0  1.0087               92.8 
Total  100.0                100.0 





 TABLE  2 
RELATIVE FREQUENCIES OF VICE CONSUMPTION IN AUSTRALIA 
(Percentages) 
Good Unconditional  Conditional on consumption of 
   Marijuana  Tobacco  Alcohol 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Marijuana 14.2  1  33.8 16.5 
Tobacco 23.7  56.3 1 25.9 
Alcohol 83.9  96.5  90.7  1 
Source:  Zhao and Harris (2004, p. 397).   41
TABLE 3 
FIRST SPECIFICATION OF PRICE RESPONSIVENESS OF DEMAND:   0 = ρ  
Good  Marijuana  Tobacco Alcohol Other   Marijuana  Tobacco  Alcohol Other   Marijuana Tobacco  Alcohol  Other 
       A.  Price Coefficients ν  ( × 10
2)    B.  Inverse of Price Coefficients 
−1 ν  ( × 10
-1 )              C.  Frisch Price Elasticities [
*
ij η ] 
Marijuana  -1.20  0 0  0    -8.33  0 0  0    -.60 0 0  0 
Tobacco 0 -.40 0  0    0  -25 0 0    0  -.20 0  0 
Alcohol 0  0  -2.00  0    0  0 -5  0    0  0  -.50  0 
Other  0 0 0  -46.40    0  0 0  -.22    0  0 0  -.50 
  D.  Slutsky Coefficients  [ πij ] ( × 10
2 )                 E.  Slutsky Price Elasticities  [ ηij ]    F.  Marshallian Price Elasticities [ ij η′ ]   
Marijuana -1.17  .01  .05  1.11    -.586  .005  .024  .557   -.610  -.019  -.024  -.547 
Tobacco .01 -.40 .02 .37    .005  -.198 .008 .186    -.003  -.206 -.008 -.182 
Alcohol .05 .02  -1.92  1.86    .012  .004  -.480  .464    -.008  -.016  -.520  -.456 




SECOND SPECIFICATION OF PRICE RESPONSIVENESS OF DEMAND:   5 . − = ρ  
Good  Marijuana  Tobacco Alcohol Other   Marijuana  Tobacco  Alcohol Other   Marijuana Tobacco  Alcohol  Other 
  A.  Price Coefficients ν  ( × 10
2)    B.  Inverse of Price Coefficients 
−1 ν  ( × 10
-1 )                    C.  Frisch Price Elasticities [
*
ij η ] 
Marijuana -1.20  -.35  .35  0   -11.12  9.45  -.22  0   -.60  -.17  .17  0 
Tobacco -.35 -.40 .35 0  9.45  -36.16 -3.44 0    -.17  -.20  .17 0 
Alcohol  .35  .35  -2.69 0    -.22  -3.44 -4.18  0   .09  .09  -.67 0 
Other  0 0 0  -46.40    0  0 0  -.22    0  0 0  -.50 
  D.  Slutsky Coefficients  [ πij ] ( × 10
2 )                     E.  Slutsky Price Elasticities  [ ηij ]               F.  Marshallian Price Elasticities [ ij η′ ]    
Marijuana  -1.17  -.34  .39  1.11    -.586 -.168 .197  .557    -.610  -.192 .149  -.547 
Tobacco -.34 -.40 .36 .37    -.168  -.198 .181  .186    -.176  -.206 .165 -.182 
Alcohol  .39  .36  -2.61  1.86    .099 .091  -.653  .464    -.079 .071  -.693  -.456 
Other 1.11  .37  1.86  -3.34    .012  .004  .020  -.036    -.008  -.016  -.020  -.964 
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                                FIGURE 1 
PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND AND 
THE DEGREE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
A.  Marijuana with respect to 
the Price of Tobacco 
 
B.  Marijuana with respect to 
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TABLE 5 
DATA FOR STOCHASTIC VICE 
Variable/ 
parameter 













Budget shares   i w         
1.   Marijuana  .02  (.01, .03)  .005  .25  1 w 0 1 < <  
2.   Tobacco  .02  (.015, .025) .0025  .125  1 w 0 2 < <  
3.   Alcohol  .04  (.03, .05)  .005  .125  1 w 0 3 < <  
4.   Other  .92  (.905, .935) .0075  .008  1 w 0 4 < < ,  ∑ − = =
3
1 i i 4 w 1 w  
      Sum  1.00         
Income flexibility        
5.  φ  -.5  (-.75,  -.25)  .  125  .25  0 < φ  
Correlation coefficient        
6.  ρ -.5  (-1.00,.00)  .25  .50  0 1 < ρ < −  
Marginal shares   i θ         
7.   Marijuana  .024  (.000, .048) .012   .50  0 1 > θ  
8.   Tobacco  .008  (.004, .012) .002  . 25  0 2 > θ  
9.   Alcohol  .04     (.02,  .06)  .01  . 25  0 3 > θ  
10. Other  .928   (.896,  .96)  .016  .017  0 4 > θ ,    ∑ θ − = θ =
3
1 i i 4 1  
      Sum  1.00         
Frisch Price coefficient matrix  ν     
 
ν   negative definite 















α + θ φ α − α −
α − θ φ α











SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS 




































































A. Frisch Price Elasticities 
*
ij [] η  
Marijuana  -.66  -.18  .18      0    -.61  -.16  .16       0 
  (.41)  (.13)  (.13)      (0)    (.30)  (.10)  (.10)       (0) 
Tobacco  -.17  -.20  .17      0    -.16  -.20  .16       0 
  (.10)  (.08)  (.10)      (0)    (.10)  (.07)  (.10)       (0) 
Alcohol  .08  .08  -.68     0    .08  .08  -.67       0 
  (.05)  (.05)  (.25)     (0)    (.05)  (.05)  (.23)       (0) 
Other     0     0     0  -.50       0     0     0  -.50 
     (0)     (0)     (0)  (.13)      (0)    (0)    (0)  (.13) 
 
B. Slutsky Price Elasticities  ij [] η  
Marijuana  -.641  -.171 .203 .609    -.590  -.160 .189 .561 
  (.393) (.125) (.140) (.373)    (.283) (.095) (.104) (.269) 
Tobacco -.162 -.201 .175 .188    -.160 -.199  .173  .186 
  (.102) (.077) (.106) (.072)    (.095) (.071) (.098) (.067) 
Alcohol .096 .088  -.654 .470    .095 .086  -.645 .464 
  (.057) (.053) (.240) (.176)    (.052) (.049) (.223) (.168) 
Other  .012 .004 .020  -.037    .012 .004 .020  -.036 
  (.006) (.001) (.007) (.012)    (.006) (.001) (.007) (.012) 
 
C. Marshallian Price Elasticities  ij [] ′ η  
Marijuana  -.665 -.195  .155 -.495    -.614 -.184  .141 -.543 
  (.390) (.125) (.140) (.371)    (.283) (.095) (.104) (.269) 
Tobacco -.170 -.209 .159  -.180    -.168 -.207  .157 -.182 
  (.102) (.077) (.106) (.072)    (.095) (.071) (.098) (.067) 
Alcohol .076 .068 -.694  -.450    .075 .066  -.685  -.456 
  (.057) (.053) (.238) (.175)    (.052) (.049) (.223) (.168) 
Other  -.008 -.016 -.020 -.964    -.008 -.016 -.020 -.964 
  (.008) (.003) (.009) (.014)    (.006) (.001) (.007) (.012) 
 
D. Income Elasticities  i [] η  
 1.323  .405  1.018  1.008    1.208  .400  1.008  1.008 
  (.807) (.115) (.292) (.019)   (.561) (.101) (.250) (.017) 
Note:  The first entry in each cell is the mean over the 5,000 trials.  The second entry, given in parentheses, 
is the associated standard deviation. 
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FIGURE 2 
A. SIMULATED FRISCH PRICE ELASTICITIES: EVERYTHING RANDOM 
      











































































































































































































































B. SIMULATED SLUTSKY PRICE ELASTICITIES: EVERYTHING RANDOM 
      



























































































































































































































































































































































C. SIMULATED MARSHALLIAN PRICE ELASTICITIES: EVERYTHING RANDOM 
      

































































































































































































































































































































































Note:  The bin-length for each elasticity is chosen so that there are at least 4,900 observations within nine bins.  In a few cases, long tails are truncated with approximately 
an equal number of observations on both sides of the mean. 
FIGURE 3 
A. SIMULATED FRISCH PRICE ELASTICITIES: BUDGET SHARES NOT RANDOM 
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B. SIMULATED SLUTSKY PRICE ELASTICITIES: BUDGET SHARES NOT RANDOM 
      
























































































































































































































































































































































C. SIMULATED MARSHALLIAN PRICE ELASTICITIES: BUDGET SHARES NOT RANDOM 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































CV=1%   52
FIGURE 4 
SIMULATED INCOME ELASTICITIES 






























































































































































































CV=-46%   53
FIGURE 5 
THE MARIJUANA DEMAND CURVE 











































Quantity (Ounces per capita)  Price (Dollars per ounce)   54
FIGURE 7 
CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA CONSUMPTION 
(Ounces per capita) 
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TABLE 7 











1.   Consumption expenditure  









2.  Tax rate  









3.  Tax revenue 









Notes:  1. Consumption expenditure is from Panel A of Table A2 for 1998. 
2. The tax rate for tobacco is derived from excise and customs revenue published in the Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare Statistics on Drug Use in Australia 2002, Tables 2.5 and 2.6, as well as 
consumption data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat. No. 5206.0 
3. The tax rate for alcohol is derived from Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005) as follows. In their Table 
11.12 (page 319), the Selvanathans report for Australia the following taxes (as percentages of 
consumer prices): Beer 43 percent, wine 23 percent and spirits 55 percent. The corresponding 
conditional budget shares (×100), from Panel B of Table A1 for 1998, are 55, 23 and 22 (in the same 
order). Thus a budget-share weighted average tax rate for alcohol as a whole is .55 × 43 + .23 × 23 + 
.22 × 55 = 41 percent, as reported in row 2 of column 4 above. 
4. Tax revenue is the product of the corresponding tax rate and consumption expenditure. 
5. Population, used to convert to per capita, refers to those aged 14 years and over. 
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TABLE 8 
 
SIMULATIONS OF VICE CONSUMPTION AND TAXATION REVENUE 
(Logarithmic changes × 100) 
 
  Exogenous change 
  Everything random  Budget shares not random 
Endogenous 
variable 
10 percentage point increase 
in the tax rate 
10 percent increase in  
the tax rate 
10 percentage point increase 
in the tax rate 
10 percent increase in  
the tax rate 
 
 
10% fall in 
marijuana 

























































10% fall in 
marijuana 























































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
I.  Real Income Constant 
Quantity consumed   
1.  Marijuana  6.75 (4.14)  -.78 (.57)  1.19 (.82)  -.93 (.68)  .83 (.57)  6.21(2.95)  -.73 (.44)  1.11  (.62)  -.87 (.53)  .78 (.43) 
2.  Tobacco  1.70 (1.08)  -.92 (.35)  1.03 (.62)  -1.09 (.42)  .72 (.43)  1.69(1.02)  -.91 (.33)  1.02  (.59)  -1.09 (.39)  .71 (.41) 
3.  Alcohol  -1.01  (.60)  .40 (.24)  -3.85(1.41)  .48 (.29)  -2.69 (.99)  -1.00 (.56)  .40 (.23)  -3.79 (1.30)  .47 (.27)  -2.65 (.91) 
Taxation Revenue                 
4.  Tobacco  1.70 (1.08)  7.49 (.35)  1.03 (.62)  8.92 (.42)  .72 (.43)  1.69(1.02)  7.50 (.33)  1.02  (.59)  8.92 (.39)  .71 (.41) 
5.  Alcohol  -1.01  (.60)  .40 (.24)  10.44(1.41)  .48 (.29)  7.31 (.99)  -1.00 (.56)  .40 (.23)  10.50 (1.30)  .47 (.27)  7.35 (.91) 
6.  Total  .26  (.24)  3.73 (.16)  6.02 (.61)  4.49 (.19)  4.21 (.42)  .27 (.19)  3.73 (.14)  6.04  (.53)  4.44 (.17)  4.23 (.37) 
II.  Money Income Constant 
Quantity consumed 
7.  Marijuana  7.01 (4.11)  -.89 (.57)  .91 (.82)  -1.06 (.68)  .64 (.57)  6.47(2.95)  -.84 (.44)  .83  (.62)  -1.00 (.53)  .58 (.43) 
8.  Tobacco  1.79 (1.08)  -.95 (.35)  .93 (.62)  -1.14 (.42)  .65 (.43)  1.77(1.02)  -.95 (.33)  .93  (.59)  -1.13 (.39)  .65 (.41) 
9.  Alcohol  -.80  (.60)  .31 (.24)  -4.08(1.40)  .37 (.29)  -2.86 (.98)  -.79 (.56)  .30 (.23)  -4.02 (1.30) .36 (.27)  -2.82 (.91) 
Taxation Revenue 
10.  Tobacco  1.79 (1.08)  7.46 (.35)  .93 (.62)  8.87 (.42)  .65 (.43)  1.77(1.02)  7.46 (.33)  .93  (.59)  8.88 (.39)  .65 (.41) 
11.  Alcohol  -.80  (.60)  .31 (.24)  10.20(1.40)  .37 (.29)  7.14 (.98)  -.79 (.56)  .30 (.23)  10.26 (1.30) .36 (.27)  7.18 (.91) 
12.  Total  .41  (.24)  3.67 (.16)  5.85 (.60)  4.36 (.19)  4.09 (.42)  .42 (.19)  3.67 (.14)  5.87  (.53)  4.36 (.17)  4.11 (.37) 
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TABLE 9 
REVENUE FROM TAXING MARIJUANA 
 
Tax revenue (dollars per capita)  Marijuana  
tax rate 










0  0 -  324 -  360 -  684 - 
10  35 (1)  318 (4)  364 (2)  717 (3) 
20  64 (6)  311 (8)  369 (5)  744 (8) 
30  86 (13)  303 (13)  376  (9)  764 (15) 
40  100 (23)  292 (19)  385 (15)  776 (25) 
50  105 (34)  277 (27)  397 (23)  779 (36) 
60  98 (46)  257 (37)  418 (37)  773 (46) 
70  79 (54)  228 (50)  455 (65)  763 (52) 
Note: The elements in the table are the means over the 5,000 trials and the corresponding standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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Figure 8 
THE MARIJUANA LAFFER CURVE 
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Note:  Panel A plots the means over the 5,000 trials. In Panel B, the boundaries of the fan chart are the 10, 20, …, 90 
percentiles of the distribution of tax revenues from the simulation, so that the solid lines are the medians, instead 
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FIGURE 9 
THE ALCOHOL-MARIJUANA TAX TRADEOFF 
(Means over 5,000 trials) 
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FIGURE 10 
THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE TRADEOFF  
 
A.  The Tradeoff 
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FIGURE 11 
CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALCOHOL TAX AND SLOPE OF TRADEOFF 
 
Alcohol tax rate × 100  Slope of tradeoff × 100 
  

































































































































































































































Mean = 35.2 
SD = 1.0 
Mean = -52.5 
SD = 7.0
Mean = 30.4 
SD = 1.5 
Mean = -46.8 
SD = 10.8
Mean = 26.0 
SD = 2.6  Mean = -42.5 
SD = 16.6
Frequency  Frequency  63
TABLE A1 
ALCOHOL EXPENDITURE AND BUDGET SHARES 
Year Beer  Wine Spirits Alcohol 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  = 
(2)+(3)+(4) 
A. Expenditures 
(Dollars per capita) 
1988  422 146 134  703 
1989  442 147 145  734 
1990  464 143 148  755 
1991  451 154 149  754 
1992  444 153 158  755 
1993  451 162 190  804 
1994  459 168 183  810 
1995  475 175 198  848 
1996  485 185 194  863 
1997  486 199 210  895 
1998  485 203 190  879 
B. Conditional Budget Shares 
(Percentages) 
1988  60 21 19   
1989  60 20 20   
1990  61 19 20   
1991  60 20 20   
1992  59 20 21   
1993  56 20 24   
1994  57 21 23   
1995  56 21 23   
1996  56 21 22   
1997  54 22 23   
1998  55 23 22   
Note:     In Panel A, “per capita” expenditure refers to expenditure divided by the number of 
Australians aged 14 years and over. 
Source: E. A. Selvanathan (2003) provided per capita expenditures defined for the total 
population, which we then converted to a 14-year-and-over basis, using population 
data from ABS Catalogue No. 3201.   64
TABLE A2 
VICE EXPENDITURE AND TOTAL CONSUMPTION 
Year Marijuana  Tobacco  Alcohol  Total Consumption 
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)   
A. Expenditures 
(Dollars per capita) 
1988  392 916 703  15,005 
1989  417 900 734  16,407 
1990  442 873 755  17,068 
1991  453 819 754  17,870 
1992  349 755 755  18,437 
1993  316 692 804  19,005 
1994  338 636 810  20,178 
1995  329 605 848  21,244 
1996  360 597 863  21,802 
1997  370 597 895  22,769 
1998  372 597 879  23,592 
B. Unconditional Budget Shares for Vice 
(Percentages) 
1988 2.6  6.1  4.7  13.4 
1989 2.5  5.5  4.5  12.5 
1990 2.6  5.1  4.4  12.1 
1991 2.5  4.6  4.2  11.3 
1992 1.9  4.1  4.1  10.1 
1993 1.7  3.6  4.2  9.5 
1994 1.7  3.2  4.0  8.8 
1995 1.5  2.8  4.0  8.4 
1996 1.7  2.7  4.0  8.4 
1997 1.6  2.6  3.9  8.2 
1998 1.6  2.5  3.7  7.8 
Note:       In Panel A, the total population aged 14 years and over is used to compute per capita 
expenditures. 
Sources:   1. Marijuana expenditure in Panel A of column 2 is the product of the price per unit and the 
quantity consumed.  The price data are from Clements (2004) and the quantity from 
Clements and Daryal (2005).  As the marijuana prices for the year 1988 and 1989 are not 
available, we compute them by backwards extrapolation by using the average annual log 
change of marijuana prices for the period 1990-98. 
2.  Panel A, column 3 is computed as total tobacco expenditure (ABS Cat. No. 5206.0) 
divided by population aged 14 and over (ABS Cat. No. 3201). 
3. Panel A, column  4 is from Table A1, column 5.  
4. Panel A,  column 5   is conventionally-defined  total   consumption  expenditure,  from 
Selvanathan (2003), plus marijuana expenditure.  The unconditional budget shares in 
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